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NASTY MEDICINE: DAUBERT V. MERRELL DOW
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. APPLIED TO A
HYPOTHETICAL MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CASE
I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of its 1992-1993 term, the United States Supreme Court
decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1 Justice Harry
Blackmun's majority opinion discussed at length the considerations that
should govern admissibility of scientific expert evidence under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.' Rather than adhering to the traditional Frye v.
United States "general acceptance" test,3 the Daubert majority set forth
its own "general observations," which, compared to the Frye test, it
deemed more consistent with the letter and spirit of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.4 In addition, the majority stressed the role of the trial judge in
assessing "whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testi-
mony is scientifically valid and... whether that reasoning or methodol-
ogy properly can be applied to the facts in issue."5 The majority asserted
its confidence "that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake this
review.' 6
This Note argues that the Daubert Court's new standards-if they
can be called such-are inadequate as decisional guidelines because they
will spawn confusion rather than foster clarity, and that Daubert would
have been a wiser decision had it embraced the Frye test.
1. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
2. Id. at 2796-98.
3. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by FED. R. EvID. 702,
construed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). Frye is
discussed in detail infra part II.B. In denying admissibility of the results of a primitive lie
detector test, the Frye court stated that
[just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimen-
tal and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific princi-'
ple or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.
Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
4. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-98.
5. Id. at 2796.
6. Id.
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The Daubert guidelines, as this Note demonstrates, are far too indef-
inite to be intelligible rules of decision. The Court described "the inquiry
... [as] a flexible one,"7 but almost could have described it as a standard-
less one. Lawyers undoubtedly will strive to take advantage of the new
judicial latitude and ambiguity to gain the sympathy of scientifically ig-
norant juries through sketchy, pseudoscientific evidence that was previ-
ously inadmissible under the Frye standard.' The Daubert Court's
"general observations" are, as Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in his dis-
sent, "not only general, but vague and abstract."9 Moreover, the
Daubert Court did not spell out just how it expected these "observa-
tions" to be applied by trial judges: It simply remanded the case for
"further proceedings consistent with this opinion."'10 Hence, trial courts
are left to their own devices in applying the Daubert principles. Thus,
this lack of specific standards may inevitably lead to an array of inconsis-
tent results.
Furthermore, the Daubert Court's vision that judges will success-
fully fulfill their "gatekeeping role,"'" effectively excluding unreliable
and irrelevant expert testimony, is arguably unrealistic. Judges are not
scientists. In many cases it will likely impose immense burdens upon
trial judges to expect them to gain an adequate understanding of prof-
fered scientific evidence.12 Even when judges do possess the skill to
7. Id. at 2797.
8. Although both plaintiffs and defendants can attempt to introduce "junk science"-for
a definition see infra note 283-Daubert may prove more of a tactical advantage for plaintiffs'
lawyers. This is true particularly in cases like Daubert, where natural sympathy for the plain-
tiff increases the likelihood of a plaintiff's verdict should the plaintiff's case get to the jury. See,
e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Brave New World, CAL. LAW., Sept. 1993, at 31, 31 (interviewing
defense attorney Raoul D. Kennedy, who, when asked about implications of Daubert ruling,
stated that "plaintiffs got the better of it"). For that reason, the hypothetical presented infra
part III.A is structured in such a way that the plaintiff is the party offering the questionable
evidence. This Author recognizes, however, that defendants may offer junk science as well.
9. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2799 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2798-99.
12. Trial judges are better educated than the average juror, but "[t]rial judges are trained
in law and rarely have a technical background." John W. Wesley, Note, Scientific Evidence
and the Question of Judicial Capacity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 685 (1984) (footnote
omitted). Moreover, a judge's use of outside sources for background information will not
necessarily guarantee that he or she will adequately grasp the presented scientific evidence. Id.
at 685-86. Juries also have difficulty in comprehending medical and scientific evidence: "In
medical malpractice actions the lay jury simply has no basis in education, training, or experi-
ence upon which to arrive at a rational and reasoned verdict." Robert G. Miceli, M.D., Depri-
vation of Due Process for Physicians: The "Failure to Diagnose" Cause ofAction, 33 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 859, 944 (1989). The same problem arguably afflicts judges who lack scientific or
technical training in whatever aspect of medicine is at issue. In addition, jurors often regard
scientific evidence as more credible than other evidence, regularly overestimating its probative
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master the science, time constraints may tempt them to cut corners and
make hasty decisions."3
Because these matters are difficult to discuss abstractly, and because
a coherent body of case law will not soon-if ever-develop under
Daubert,4 this Note examines the ramifications of Daubert in the con-
text of a hypothetical medical malpractice case. Part II reviews the facts
of Daubert, the traditional Frye test for admission of scientific evidence,
and the Daubert Court's majority and dissenting opinions. Part III ana-
lyzes the admissibility of two different hypothetical experts' testimony in
a hypothetical medical malpractice case, first under Daubert, and then
under Frye. The problems with admitting each experts' testimony are
also discussed. Part IV proposes that Daubert be abandoned and that
federal courts return to the Frye test, utilizing preappointed committees
of experts to rule on general acceptance of scientific techniques. These
committees will help ensure that only valid, generally accepted scientific
evidence is admitted.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Facts of Daubert
Plaintiffs-petitioners were two children and their parents." They
alleged that Bendectin, a drug manufactured by Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals and ingested by the mothers during pregnancy, caused
value. See Renee A. Forinash, Comment, Analyzing Scientific Evidence: From Validity to
Reliability with a Two-Step Approach, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 223, 243 (1992). Similarly, a judge
who lacks the technical training to grasp and evaluate proffered scientific evidence may be
tempted to allow such evidence uncritically and let the jury sort it out.
13. Regarding this dilemma, one commentator aptly observed, "'The ideal solution would
be to have judges who specialize in scientific matters, but I don't see that happening for some
time.'" Natalie Angier, Court Ruling on Scientific Evidence: A Just Burden, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 1993, at A8 (quoting Dr. F. Sherwood Rowland, president of American Association
for the Advancement of Science).
14. At best, it will take considerable time for the Court to illustrate the application of its
new principles through analyses and rulings upon actual expert testimony dilemmas. The pro-
cess of fleshing out Daubert's "general observations" cannot happen quickly because courts
lack constitutional authority to announce hypothetical results or render advisory opinions.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (requiring that there be case or controversy before federal courts
render decisions); Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 102 (1982) ("We do not sit to
decide hypothetical issues or to give advisory opinions about issues as to which there are not
adverse parties before us."); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) ("The exercise of
judicial power under Art. III of the Constitution depends on the existence of a case or contro-
versy."); Asbury Hosp. v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1945) ("This Court is without
power to give advisory opinions. It will not decide constitutional issues which are hypotheti-
cal, or in advance of the necessity for deciding them .... ").
15. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2791 (1993).
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the children's limb-reduction birth defects.16 The mothers' doctors pre-
scribed Bendectin to treat nausea and vomiting during pregnancy.17 The
district court dismissed the case on summary judgment, 18 reasoning that
the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof by "com[ing] forward
with statistically significant epidemiological evidence"' 9 of causation,
and that their evidence supported, at best, the contention that "Bendec-
tin could possibly have caused plaintiffs' injuries."20 Merrell Dow, for its
part, had "introduced evidence that no epidemiological study ever per-
formed ha[d] concluded that the use of Bendectin by pregnant women
[significantly correlated with the incidence of] birth defects in those wo-
men's children."21 Furthermore, the plaintiffs relied upon a study that
"was apparently never published or subjected to peer review. "22 The dis-
trict court therefore held that there was no competent proof of a causal
connection between the use of Bendectin and the birth defects, 23 and ac-
cordingly granted summary judgment for the drug manufacturer.24
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.25 Relying on the Frye
general acceptance test,26 the district court's decision, and the outcome
of Bendectin litigation in three other circuits, 27 the Ninth Circuit held
that "the available animal and chemical studies, together with plaintiffs'
expert reanalysis of epidemiological studies, provided insufficient founda-
tion to allow admission of expert testimony to the effect that Bendectin
caused plaintiffs' injuries."' 28 The Ninth Circuit further observed that the
plaintiffs' reanalyses of epidemiological studies were not "generally ac-
cepted by the scientific community" because "they were unpublished, not
subjected to the normal peer review process and generated solely for use
in litigation.
29
16. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal.
1989), affid, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
17. Id
18. Id. at 576.
19. Id. at 575.
20. Id. at 576.
21. Id. at 575 (emphasis added).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 576.
24. Id.
25. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. [Daubert I1], 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir.
1991), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
26. Id. at 1129.
27. Id. at 1130 (citing Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th
Cir.), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); Richardson v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989);
Lynch v. Merrell-National Labs., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987)).
28. Id. at 1131.
29. Id.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari3° "in light of
sharp divisions among the courts regarding the proper standard for the
admission of expert testimony."'" Agreeing with plaintiffs, the Court
concluded that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye test.32
B. The Frye "General Acceptance" Test
In 1923 the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia Circuit
issued a terse opinion in which it created the Frye "general acceptance"
test.33 At issue in that 1923 murder case was the admissibility of a sys-
tolic blood pressure deception test,34 "a crude precursor to the polygraph
[lie detector] machine."35 Having undergone this test prior to trial, the
defendant offered as an expert witness the scientist who conducted the
test to describe its results.36 Both the trial and appellate courts ruled the
evidence inadmissible.37 The appellate court held that because it was dif-
ficult to define "[j]ust when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the
line between the experimental and demonstrable stages," the proffered
scientific testimony "must be sufficiently established to have gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. "38 The Frye
court concluded that since the systolic blood pressure deception test had
not yet gained such general acceptance among scientists, its results were
inadmissible.3 9
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, many
courts encountering the problem of novel scientific evidence relied upon
the Frye court's "general acceptance" standard.' Approval of the Frye
test, however, was not universal.4" In the 1960s and 1970s, "the legal
profession began to nibble, scratch, pick, and poke at the old [Frye] rule,
30. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
31. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2792. Compare United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59-60
(D.C. Cir.) (applying general acceptance standard), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987), with
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (3d Cir. 1990) (rejecting
general acceptance standard).
32. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793.
33. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by FED. R. EVID.
702, construed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
34. Id.
35. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793.
36. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
37. Id.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id.
40. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702-34 to
702-35 (1992).
41. See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
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until in some circles the tattered remains were swept aside entirely."42
Reasons for this challenge may have included the "technologically pessi-
mistic and anti-establishment" mood prevailing in the 1960s and 1970s,
a3
and the fact that the Frye test often prevents the admission of "new, but
valid, scientific techniques."'  Codification of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence in 1975a s complicated matters. Rule 702, dealing with expert testi-
mony, states that a scientific expert may testify if that testimony "will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.... ." While this rule makes no mention of "general acceptance,"
46
several circuits-including the Sixth, a7 Seventh, a" and Ninth circuits,
49
and a district court within the District of Columbia Circuit,5 0 nonethe-
less continued to follow the traditional Frye rule regarding issues of sci-
entific testimony.51  Other courts, however, including the Second,
5 2
42. Peter W. Huber, On Law and Sciosophy, 24 VAL. U. L. REv. 319, 342-43 (1990).
43. Id. at 342.
44. Forinash, supra note 12, at 228. However, this is not likely to be a concern in medical
malpractice cases using the Frye standard. See infra part IV.
45. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified at 28 U.S.C. app. at
733-804 (1988)).
46. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
47. See United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954, 962 (6th Cir.) (stating that gas chro-
matograph FID/FRD analysis is generally accepted in field of oil matching), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 827 (1981); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 559 (6th Cir. 1977) (stating that evi-
dence of ion microphobic analysis of human hair should not be admitted because court was not
convinced that it had yet reached level of general acceptance in its field).
48. See United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 754-57 (7th Cir. 1981) (maintaining
that expert astronomer's relying on sun chart to date photograph in question was not generally
accepted).
49. See United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that Forward
Looking Infrared System "is not a generally accepted technique among the scientific commu-
nity for the unique identification of remote objects").
50. See Robertson v. McCloskey, 680 F. Supp. 408, 409, 412 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding that
psychodynamics of memory and perception was "novel form of scientific evidence" that had
not gained general acceptance in its field and was not admissible).
51. One theory that supported the view that the Frye test survived the enactment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence was that
[b]ecause the Federal Rules were not intended to be a comprehensive codification of
the rules of evidence, a number of evidentiary rules are not covered, and many
others, though mentioned, are treated only in a general fashion.... [B]ecause Frye
was the established rule and no statement repudiating Frye appears in the legislative
history, the general acceptance standard remains intact.
Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197, 1229 (1980).
52. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1200 n.11 (2d Cir. 1978) (using FED. R.
EVID. 702 rather than Frye general acceptance test), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
1518
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Third,53 and Fourth Circuits,54 rejected the Frye standard after the en-
actment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Daubert decision re-
solved this dispute among the circuits over viability of the Frye test by
holding "that the Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence."
'55
C. The Daubert Majority Opinion
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence "as we would any stat-
ute,"56 Justice Blackmun's majority opinion noted that the rules, particu-
larly Rule 402,27 generally allow the admission of any relevant
evidence.58 Justice Blackmun further noted that Rule 702, dealing spe-
cifically with scientific evidence, mentions neither in its text nor in its
53. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237-42 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that
variety of factors, in addition to "a particular degree of acceptance," were important in assess-
ing reliability of scientific evidence (emphasis added)).
54. See United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.) (stating that "[u]nless an
exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a particular technique makes its use prejudicial
or likely to mislead the jury, it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the same man-
ner as other expert testimony"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
55. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793.
56. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793 (1993). Justice
Blackmun examined the text of Rules 702, 401, and 402, as well as the legislative history and
intent behind the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at 2793-94.
57. Rule 402 provides that "[a]ll relevant evidence is'admissible, except as otherwise pro-
vided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible." Rule 401 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." See also New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 345 (1985) ("[I]t is universally recognized that evidence, to be
relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate fact in issue, but only have 'any
tendency to make the existence of any fact . . . of consequence . . . more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.'" (quoting FED. R. EvID. 401) (emphasis
added)).
58. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793-94. Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
evidence is found admissible more often than before. See David P. Leonard, Power and Re-
sponsibility in Evidence Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 937, 956 (1990). One rationale for the mod-
em bias toward admissibility is that "courts and codifiers have come to believe that truth is
likely to emerge when more, rather than less, evidence is heard by the trier of fact." Id.; see
also Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly
Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 497 (1983) (arguing that Federal Rules of Evi-
dence expand definition of relevancy); Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Pretrial Importance and
Adaptation of the "Trial" Evidence Rules, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 965, 970 (noting that Federal
Rules of Evidence place pressure on presiding judge "to resolve any doubt in favor of admit-
ting the evidence"); Paul F. Rothstein, Some Themes in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 33 FED. B.J. 21, 21 (1974) (arguing that Federal Rules of Evidence contain bias toward
admissibility).
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drafting history the Frye decision or a "general acceptance" standard.59
He reasoned that such a standard "would be at odds with the 'liberal
thrust' of the Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing the
traditional barriers to "opinion" testimony.' ""
Justice Blackmun next asserted that although the Federal Rules of
Evidence supersede the Frye test, the Rules still place limits on the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence.6 Rule 702 in particular "clearly con-
templates some degree of regulation of the subjects and theories about
which an expert may testify."62 The Rule states, "[i]f scientific, techni-
cal, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, [a qualified expert
witness] ... may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
Justice Blackmun reasoned that because Rule 702 requires that the ex-
pert's testimony pertain to "scientific knowledge," it "establishes a stan-
dard of evidentiary reliability."63 In order to qualify as "scientific," the
inference or assertion must be grounded in the procedures and methods
of science." Justice Blackmun further explained that the term "knowl-
edge," as used in Rule 702, implies that the assertion must be more than
a "subjective belief or unsupported speculation."6 Proposed testimony
"must be derived by the scientific method" and must be "based on what
is known."6 6 Justice Blackmun observed that Rule 702 addresses the is-
sue of relevance in the requirement that the expert testimony must "as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue. '' 67 Before the evidence can be admitted, this "helpfulness" stan-
dard requires that there be "a valid scientific connection" between the
proffered testimony and the issue in question.68
According to the Daubert majority, trial judges faced with proffered
expert testimony must determine whether the litigant is proposing expert
evidence that, in accordance with Rule 702, is indeed scientific knowl-
edge that "will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in
issue."" This requires that trial judges make "a preliminary assessmentof whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
59. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
60. Id. (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
61. Id. at 2794-95.
62. Id. at 2795.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2796.
69. Id. at 2795.
Vol. 27:1513
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scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology prop-
erly can be applied to the facts in issue."7 0 To assist trial judges in mak-
ing this determination, Justice Blackmun proposed four "general
observations.""1
First, the verifiability of the theory or technique-"whether it can
be (and has been) tested" 72 -should be considered, because testing a sci-
entific hypothesis helps determine whether it is "falsifiable." 73
Second, courts should consider whether the scientific theory or tech-
nique has been published and subjected to peer review.74 The majority
acknowledged that publication "does not necessarily correlate with relia-
bility" and "is not a sine qua non of admissibility": Occasionally a the-
ory will be well-grounded although it has not been published.75
Therefore, publication in a peer-reviewed journal, while not dispositive,
should still be considered in determining the scientific validity of a partic-
ular technique upon which the expert opinion is based.76
Third, courts should consider "the known or potential rate of error"
of the given scientific technique.77
Finally, even though Justice Blackmun declared that the Federal
Rules replaced the Frye test, he included "general acceptance" as the
fourth factor trial judges should consider in ruling on admissibility.78
After setting forth these four factors, Justice Blackmun emphasized
that the admissibility inquiry is to remain flexible: It should focus on the
relevance and reliability of the scientific principles and methodology of
the proposed expert testimony, not on the scientific conclusions them-
selves.7 9 Justice Blackmun further noted that trial judges should remain
70. Id. at 2796.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. In dissent Chief Justice Rehnquist announced, "I am at a loss to know what is
meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its 'falsifiability,' and I
suspect some of [the federal district judges] will be, too." Id. at 2800 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
74. Id. at 2797.
75. Id.; see, e.g., David F. Horrobin, The Philosophical Basis of Peer Review and the Sup-
pression of Innovation, 263 JAMA 1438, 1440-41 (documenting several cases where innovative
scientific hypotheses based on solid scientific evidence were repeatedly rejected for publication
by peer-reviewed journals).
76. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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"mindful" of applicable rules other than Rule 702-namely, Rules 703,
706, and 403.80
'Justice Blackmun concluded by addressing two concerns expressed
by the parties and amici. First, in addressing defendant-respondent Mer-
rell Dow's apprehension that abandoning the Frye general acceptance
test would result in a "free-for-all" where "befuddled juries are con-
founded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions," Justice
Blackmun declared that more confidence should be placed in the capabil-
ities of both jurors and the adversary system in general.8 He maintained
that the traditional methods of attacking questionable evidence-namely,
cross-examination, showing of contrary evidence, and careful explana-
tion of the burden of proof, as well as the availability of summary judg-
ment-would assure that the foundation of proffered scientific testimony
meets the Rule 702 requirements.
8 2
Second, Justice Blackmun addressed the petitioners' concern that
the screening role for trial judges would be "stifling," "repressive," and
adverse to "the search for truth.18 3 Justice Blackmun responded that
there are differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and in
the laboratory: Law, he said, must resolve disputes quickly and conclu-
sively.84 Although conjectures that are "probably wrong" are useful in
80. Id. at 2797-98. Rule 703 states that expert opinions based on hearsay are to be admit-
ted only if the data or facts are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." Rule 706 allows the court, on its
own motion, to appoint and select expert witnesses. Rule 403 permits relevant evidence to be
excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." Of Rule 403 Justice Blackmun noted that in
weighing the possibility of prejudice against probative value, judges exert more dominion over
experts than over lay witnesses. Id. at 2798.
81. Id. Although Justice Blackmun seems to trust lay jurors' abilities to understand ade-
quately and make decisions based on complex scientific evidence, this ability frequently is
questioned, particularly in medical malpractice actions. See, e.g., Elliott M. Abramson, The
Medical Malpractice Imbroglio: A Non-Adversarial Suggestion, 78 KY. L.J. 293, 295 (1989-
1990) ("Juries frequently cannot understand the technical, confusing, and often conflicting
testimony of medical experts, or the distinctions between injuries attributable to a physician's
negligence and injuries that fall within normal statistical probabilities of occurrence." (foot-
notes omitted)); Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for Resolving
Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365, 1370 (1989) ("[J]uries cannot evaluate
independently the expert testimony almost always introduced in malpractice cases." (footnote
omitted)); Miceli, supra note 12, at 944-45 ("In medical malpractice actions the lay jury sim-
ply has no basis in education, training, or experience upon which to arrive at a rational and
reasoned verdict.... Lay jurors are no more enlightened as to medical concepts upon which
they deliberate than were Socrates' cave dwellers when deliberating as to the nature of
shadows on the wall."); see also infra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
82. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
83. Id
84. Id
1522
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science, in the law they are of little use in "reaching a quick, final, and
binding legal judgment-often of great consequence-about a particular
set of events in the past." 5 The majority therefore recognized that in
practice, no matter how flexible the trial judge's gatekeeping role is, occa-
sionally innovative and authentic scientific testimony will be withheld
from the jury. 6 Because the Federal Rules of Evidence were designed
for use in legal disputes and not for scientific purposes, however, this was
deemed to be the appropriate balance.87
Justice Blackmun summarized by reiterating that the Federal Rules
of Evidence do not require "general acceptance" of proffered scientific
testimony, but that under the Rules-particularly Rule 702-trial judges
must ensure "that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable founda-
tion and is relevant to the task at hand."8 8 These requirements will be
met if the evidence is "pertinent" and based on "scientifically valid prin-
ciples."8 9 Because the district court and court of appeals based their de-
cisions almost completely on "general acceptance" in the form of
publication, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of ap-
peals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its
opinion. 9°
D. The Daubert Concurrence and Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in
part, agreeing that the Federal Rules of Evidence replaced the Frye gen-
eral acceptance test.91 They dissented in part, however, disapproving of
the "general observations" laid out in the majority opinion.92 Noting
that "'[g]eneral observations' by this Court customarily carry great
weight with lower federal courts," the dissenters declared that the offered
observations were flawed in that they were "not applied to deciding
whether or not particular testimony was or was not admissible," and
were therefore "not only general, but vague and abstract." 93 Further-
more, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the amicus briefs filed
were unusual because they dealt with "definitions of scientific knowledge,
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2798-99.
87. Id. at 2799.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2799-800 (1993)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
92. Id. at 2799 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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scientific method, scientific validity, and peer review"-matters that the
dissenters felt were "far afield from the expertise of judges.""4 Because
scientific evidence constitutes "unusual subject matter," Chief Justice
Rehnquist implied that the majority may have "decid[ed] more than [it]
ha[d] to" in interpreting the Rules.95
The dissenting opinion pointed to many questions that the major-
ity's "general observations" failed to answer.96 Do the "general observa-
tions," described as "dicta," apply only to scientific testimony or to other
types of Rule 702 expert testimony as well?9 7 Should a distinction be
drawn between scientific and technical knowledge?9" In assessing the sci-
entific status of a theory, will federal judges understand what "fal-
sifiability" of that theory means?99  The dissenters closed by
acknowledging that Rule 702 does give trial judges "some gatekeeping
responsibility" in ruling on the admissibility of proffered expert testi-
mony; they expressed doubt, however, that Rule 702 confers on trial
judges the authority or obligation "to become amateur scientists" when
making rulings.l°°
III. ANALYSIS
In analyzing the potential impact of the Daubert decision, this Note
proposes a hypothetical medical malpractice case with two variations.
Each variation will assume (1) that a physician has negligently failed to
diagnose breast cancer, and (2) that the plaintiff is attempting to prove,
through the testimony of a purported scientific expert witness, that if the
diagnosis had been made earlier, an experimental treatment would have
been available, thus affording a chance to cure the breast cancer.101 The
94. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 2800 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
97. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
98. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
99. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
100. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
101. The loss of a "substantial possibility of survival" can be actionable. In fact, in some
jurisdictions, even a small possibility is enough. See, for example, Hicks v. United States, 368
F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966), where the lost-chance-to-cure doctrine is stated as follows:
When a defendant's negligent action or inaction has effectively terminated a per-
son's chance of survival, it does not lie in the defendant's mouth to raise conjectures
as to the measure of the chances that he has put beyond the possibility of realization.
If there was any substantial possibility of survival and the defendant has destroyed it,
he is answerable.
Id. at 632 (emphasis added); see also Thomas v. Corso, 288 A.2d 379, 390-91 (Md. 1972)
(affirming jury determination of loss of substantial possibility of survival, since defendant phy-
sician's failure to treat decedent increased decedent's risk of death). California courts, how-
ever, do "not recognize a cause of action for wrongful death based on medical negligence
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two variations will differ, however, as to the scientific basis of the prof-
fered expert opinion. This Note applies the Daubert criteria to the scien-
tific evidence proffered in each of the two variations to predict how a
court would rule as to its admissibility, and why. This Note then ex-
plains the problems of evaluating the discussed testimony under Daubert,
and explains why the Frye test should be retained. This Note discusses
the benefits of the Frye test, as well as any differences in the outcome of
the hypothetical resulting from application of the Frye test.
A. The Hypothetical
A forty-nine year-old woman (plaintiff's decedent), who has a family
history of breast cancer, goes to her family doctor of twenty years, Dr. X,
on day one of year one for a physical examination. Dr. X performs a
regular physical exam, but fails to examine her breasts-Dr. X only asks
her if she has noticed any lumps or discharge. Plaintiff's decedent replies
that she has not noticed any discharge, but is unsure about lumps, be-
cause she feels that her breast tissue has always felt "irregular" and
"lumpy in parts." Based on her statement, Dr. X, who has examined her
breasts in previous years, informs her that a problem is unlikely and fails
to order a mammogram-a soft-tissue X-ray used to detect breast cancer.
One year later, on day one of year two, an insurance company doc-
tor examines plaintiff's decedent for new insurance coverage. The doctor
performs a breast exam, palpates1"2 lumps, and tells her to have them
followed up.
The same day, plaintiff's decedent returns to Dr. X, who performs a
mammogram, a breast biopsy, and biopsies of some regional lymph
nodes. Due to her recent onset of severe headaches and impaired vision,
Dr. X also orders a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)1 °3 scan of her
where the decedent did not have a greater than 50% chance of survival had the defendant
properly diagnosed and treated the condition." Bromme v. Pavitt, 5 Cal. App. 4th 1487, 1504-
05, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 608, 618 (1992); accord Dumas v. Cooney, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1593, 1603-11,
1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584, 589-94 (1991) (declining to establish lenient standard of causation in
medical malpractice cases when loss of chance for survival is less-than-likely or mere possibil-
ity). Because the details of the loss-of-chance-to-cure theory are beyond the scope of this Note,
the hypothetical will assume that the case is otherwise legally viable if the proffered scientific
or technical evidence is admitted.
102. "Palpate" means "[t]o examine by touch, esp[ecially] for medical diagnosis." THE
DOUBLEDAY DICTIONARY 522 (1975) [hereinafter DOUBLEDAY DICTIONARY].
103. Magnetic Resonance Imaging is a noninvasive radiologic technique. The images pro-
duced are based upon the radiofrequency (RF) signal that body tissues' hydrogen nuclei emit
in the presence of a strong magnetic field, following exposure to RF pulses. HARRISON'S
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 867 (Jean D. Wilson et al. eds., 12th ed. 1991). MRI
provides excellent resolution of neural structures. THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND
THERAPY 1323 (Robert Berkow et al. eds., 15th ed. 1987) [hereinafter MERCK MANUAL].
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brain. The results of the biopsies show that she has malignant breast
cancer, which has spread not only to several axillary' ° lymph nodes,
but, as indicated on the MRI, also to an inoperable location in her brain.
Plaintiff's decedent is nonresponsive to radiation and chemotherapy.
Within one year she dies.
Her estate sues Dr. X for negligence in failing to diagnose her breast
cancer on day one of year one. The parties stipulate that this failure to
diagnose was negligent.
They also stipulate, however, that given the state of plaintiff's carci-
noma as of day one of year two, and the number of locations to which it
had spread, it is probable that at the time of Dr. X's admittedly negligent
failure to diagnose plaintiff's decedent, tumors were already present, can-
cerous, and beginning to spread. It is conceded that traditional methods
of surgery, radiation, and chemotherapy would most likely have yielded
a zero percent chance of survival; plaintiff therefore argues that a
nontraditional treatment would have cured the decedent's cancer. At
trial plaintiff's theory is that the failure to diagnose foreclosed any chance
of cure.105 The defense argues that the admittedly negligent diagnosis
did not result in a lost chance to cure, and the plaintiff's decedent could
not have been treated successfully even if a correct diagnosis had been
made on day one of year one.
Assume that the case is in federal court on diversity of citizenship
grounds'016 and that the substantive law of California applies. 0 7 Assume
further that the trial judge in this hypothetical adheres to the Daubert
majority's four "general observations."
1. Hypothetical A: Holistic practitioner
Plaintiff presents as an expert witness a holistic practitioner who
does not possess a medical degree. The practitioner testifies that he can
prepare a decoction of herbs that will arrest, and often reverse, breast
cancer, even after it has begun to spread or metastasize. He states that if
the diagnosis of plaintiff's decedent had been correctly made on day one
of year one, given the probable stage of the cancer at that point, his treat-
ment could have cured her. This practitioner has independently tested
Although it requires that the patient's head or body be placed in a strong magnetic field, MRI
carries no known risk. Id.
104. "Axillary" is a term describing the axilla, commonly known as the "armpit" region.
See DOUBLEDAY DICTIONARY, supra note 102, at 50.
105. For a discussion of loss of chance to cure, see supra note 101.
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
107. In diversity cases the substantive law of the state in which the court sits applies. See
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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his preparation on ten patients with breast cancer. Of the ten, seven have
shown improvements including shrinkage of palpable tumor mass and
loss or reduction of symptoms from the time of treatment to the pres-
ent-which varies depending on the patient, from one to five years. This
"expert" published his results one year ago in a nonpeer-reviewed holis-
tic medical journal. Nine months after publication, a holistic practi-
tioner in another state wrote to this expert, stating that she tried the
described treatment on eight of her patients with breast cancer, and that
as of the date of the letter, four patients had demonstrated tumor
shrinkage and reduction of symptoms. Plaintiff's expert does not know if
any other practitioners have attempted to treat breast cancer with his
herbal therapy.
2. Hypothetical B: Ph.D. pharmacologist; experimental drug
In this variation plaintiff presents an expert who is not an M.D., but
instead is a Ph.D. pharmacologist employed by a drug company seeking
approval of a new experimental drug (Drug E). The pharmacologist is
the chief investigator for animal studies at the drug company. In the
studies performed thus far, breast cancer was induced in rats and
monkeys.108 These animals subsequently were treated with Drug E.
Different success rates were noted at various stages of breast cancer. At
early metastatic stages-plaintiff's decedent's condition on day one of
year one-the animals showed a ninety percent rate of remission; that is,
after cessation of treatment, the cancer did not recur, and ninety percent
of the animals appeared symptom-free. 109 To date, adverse side effects
and toxicity have been minimal. This pharmacologist and his drug-com-
pany colleagues recently published these breakthrough results in the New
England Journal of Medicine. In addition, the drug company has re-
cently applied to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to begin
human clinical trials. However, since the FDA has not yet approved the
application, human trials have not yet begun.110
108. In testing drugs on animals, typically two or more species are tested, "since a drug
may affect one differently from another." Jeffrey P. Cohn, The Beginnings: Laboratory and
Animal Studies, in FROM TEsT TUBE TO PATIENT: NEw DRUG DEVELOPMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 6, 8 (1990) [hereinafter NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT].
109. "[C]omplete remission or complete response" (CR) refers to a disappearance of any
clinical evidence of the cancer. MERCK MANUAL, supra note 103, at 1219. A "partial re-
sponse" (PR) refers to a greater than 50% reduction in size of any tumor masses; although life
may be prolonged, tumor regrowth is inevitable. Id. "Survival" refers to the time interval
between complete remission and death. Id.
110. In new drug development, the "FDA first becomes involved when a drug company has
completed its testing in animals and is ready to test a drug on humans." Cohn, supra note 108,
at 9.
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This pharmacologist says that based on his animal studies, Drug E
would probably be ninety percent effective in bringing plaintiff's decedent
into complete remission had she received treatment starting on day one
of year one. He does concede, however, that animal studies are not con-
clusive in determining success with human subjects.
While not officially available for human use in the United States,
Drug E is currently available in other countries that do not require FDA
approval."'1 Conclusive data as to its efficacy in humans has not yet been
obtained. Finally, plaintiff's decedent had the means on day one of year
one to go to one of these foreign countries and receive treatment with
Drug E.
B. Determining the Admissibility of the Hypothetical Evidence Under
Daubert and Frye
1. Holistic practitioner
a. Daubert analysis
i. reliability and relevance
Using Daubert to determine the admissibility of this testimony, the
trial judge first must determine whether the proffered testimony is indeed
"(1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand
or determine a fact in issue." ' 2 In doing so the trial judge must examine
the scientific validity of the underlying reasoning or methodology.'1 3
The first issue is whether the results of this holistic practitioner's
testing of his herbal mixture on ten patients qualify as "scientific knowl-
edge." To be scientific, the Daubert Court states that an assertion must
be grounded in the procedures and methods of science. 1 4 Here, the as-
sertion is that the mixture is efficacious against early metastatic breast
cancer. To a trial judge with no scientific background, this holistic prac-
111. Prior to being FDA approved and available in the United States, new drugs may al-
ready be available in foreign countries. See, e.g., K. Wayne Hindmarsh & Donald F. LeGatt,
Mexican Drug Therapy, 17 CLINICAL ToxICOLOGY 85, 85, 93-95 (1980) (discussing non-
FDA-approved drug Laetrile as example of drug available in Mexicali, Mexico clinic); Carl G.
Kardinal, M.D., Laetrile in Historical Perspective, 77 Mo. MED. 564, 568 (1980) (stating that
although Hoxsey medicines for "internal cancer" were not FDA approved and were illegally
offered as effective cancer treatment, they were still available in Tijuana). Often, the FDA
considers information on drugs used abroad: "[Blefore an investigational drug can be given to
the first patient, the sponsor has to provide [the] FDA with ... information, if there is any,
about previous use of the drug in humans... abroad." Ken Flieger, Testing in 'Real People',
in NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT, supra note 108, at 11, 11.
112. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2795.
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titioner's study very well may appear to be scientifically sound. In the
Daubert opinion, Justice Blackmun states that "the subject of scientific
testimony [need not] be 'known' to a certainty; arguably, there are no
certainties in science." '15 Unfortunately, this reminder may enhance any
temptation on the part of the district judge to admit the holistic practi-
tioner's scientifically questionable testimony. The majority's quoting of
two amicus briefs may further reassure the trial judge that this nontradi-
tional treatment possibly may qualify as "scientific knowledge." 16 Jus-
tice Blackmun summarized that the "scientific knowledge" requirement
of expert testimony "establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability";117
"evidentiary reliability," he explained in a footnote, "will be based upon
scientific validity."' 18 The trial judge who is ruling on the admissibility
of this holistic practitioner's testimony may be easily convinced that be-
cause the treatment cured seven patients, the opinion that it is medically
efficacious is, therefore, reliable.
The next step in Daubert's admissibility analysis requires the judge
to inquire whether the testimony "'will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.' "19 This step, accord-
ing to Justice Blackmun, addresses the issue of relevance. 120 The holistic
practitioner's testimony appears relevant to the issue in this hypothetical
case. If the practitioner had treated the plaintiff's decedent with the
herbal mixture on day one of year one, she arguably might have exper-
ienced tumor shrinkage or reduction of symptoms, as did seven of the ten
subjects tested. The connection between the proffered testimony and the
issue of causation-that is, lost chance to cure-is clear here. Because
the testimony addresses this issue, 2 1 the trial judge should find that it is
relevant and hence that it will "assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue." 122
115. Id.
116. Id. "'Indeed, scientists do not assert that they know what is immutably "true"--they
are committed to searching for new, temporary theories to explain, as best they can, phenom-
ena ....... Id. (quoting Brief for Nicolaas Bloembergen et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 9, Daubert (No. 92-102)). "'Science is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge
about the universe. Instead, it represents aprocess for proposing and refining theoretical expla-
nations about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement ....... Id. (quoting
Brief for the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the National Acad-
emy of Sciences as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 7-8, Daubert (No. 92-102)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2795 n.9.
119. Id. at 2795 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 702).
120. Id.
121. Although the proffered scientific evidence does not address the issue of negligent mis-
diagnosis, this has already been conceded and is not in question.
122. FED. R. EvID. 702.
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ii. general observations
To further ensure that this scientific evidence indeed complies with
Rule 702's requirements, the trial judge next must run though the
Daubert majority's four "general observations."' 123 First, the trial judge
should consider the testability of this holistic practitioner's proposed
treatment; the judge should look to whether the proposed theory "can be
(and has been) tested."' 124 According to the evidence presented, the ex-
pert arguably has tested this herbal treatment; his results reveal a success
rate of seven out of ten, or seventy percent. In addition, the out-of-state
practitioner who wrote to this expert claims to have tested this treatment
on eight of her patients, and claims to have observed improvements in
four patients after nine months-a fifty percent success rate. Although a
twenty percent difference between the success rates of these two in-
dependent tests exists, it arguably is due to the small sample size of pa-
tients tested. 125  According to the Daubert opinion, "the statements
constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of [an] empirical
test,"' 126 and "the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its fal-
sifiability, or refutability, or testability."' 127 Because an out-of-state prac-
titioner reported that the treatment in question caused four of eight of
her patients to experience tumor shrinkage and reduction of symptoms,
the trial judge easily might conclude that the holistic practitioner's treat-
ment was capable of an empirical test. This treatment was thereby
proven to be repeatable, giving it "scientific status."
The second "general observation" that the trial judge must consider
is whether the practitioner has published the scientific theory or tech-
nique and has subjected it to peer review. 128 As mentioned, this holistic
practitioner has published the results of his study, but the journal in
which his study appears is not peer-reviewed. A traditional, peer-re-
viewed medical journal may not be interested in publishing a holistic
123. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
124. l
125. In planning an experiment such as drug testing, the size of the sample population to be
tested must be resolved early on. See Jennie A. Freiman, M.D., et al., The Importance of Beta,
the Type II Error, and Sample Size in the Design and Interpretation of the Randomized Con-
trolled Trial, in MEDICAL USES OF STATISTICS 357, 358 (John C. Bailar III & Frederick
Mosteller eds., 2d ed. 1992). Because "very small samples often lead to results that are of no
practical use," selecting a sample of appropriate size is critical. WAYNE W. DANIEL, BIOS-
TATISTICS: A FOUNDATION FOR ANALYSIS IN THE HEALTH SCIENCES 143 (3d ed. 1983).
126. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797 (quoting C. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE
49 (1966)).
127. Id. (quoting K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCI-
ENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)).
128. Id.
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study of this kind. Therefore, courts may have to consider the opinions
of other holistic practitioners, without the benefit of traditional publica-
tion in a peer-reviewed journal. On peer review the Daubert majority
states that "it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodol-
ogy will be detected."12 9 Arguably, the fact that another practitioner
tested this treatment could assist in detecting any substantive flaws in
methodology. Furthermore, the trial judge could take into account the
Daubert majority's assertion that "publication (or lack thereof) in a peer-
reviewed journal [is] not [a] dispositive consideration in assessing the sci-
entific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an
opinion is premised."' 3 ° The trial judge, therefore, may simply conclude
that publication in the nonpeer-reviewed holistic medical journal is suffi-
cient to meet this second prong, since an additional holistic practitioner
tested the treatment.
The third "general observation" that Daubert instructs trial courts
to consider is "the known or potential rate of error."'' The Daubert
Court neither proposes specific guidelines in this area nor attempts to
explain exactly how error-rate analysis would apply to the case before it.
The Court does, however, cite United States v. Smith'3 2 and United
States v. Williams,'33 both of which address the issue of admissibility of
spectrographic voice identification evidence in criminal trials.' 34 In
Smith the court held error rates of 0.31% for false identifications and
0.53% for false eliminations acceptable, while holding error rates of
62.7% and 83.33% unacceptable. 135 In Williams the court deemed a
false identification rate of 6.3%-which was reduced to 2.4% after the
elimination of doubtful comparisons-tolerable from the standpoint of
admissibility of the evidence.1
36
The problem of applying the rate-of-error concept to medical cases,
such as this hypothetical, is not at all straightforward. In biomedical
research the rate-of-error concept is much more difficult to apply, and
numbers are much more difficult to calculate, than in the voiceprint cases
cited by the Daubert Court. In computer voice analysis, for example, the
probability of error should be relatively simple to determine using con-
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 869 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1989).
133. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
134. See Smith, 869 F.2d at 350; Williams, 583 F.2d at 1197.
135. Smith, 869 F.2d at 354.
136. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198.
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trolled blind testing. 137  Skilled operators could, for example, be con-
fronted with test subjects who are known to the experimenters-but not
to the operators-to have either made or not made certain voice exem-
plars. 138 The operators then could attempt to match the subjects' voices
with the previously made exemplars. 139 In that way the experimenters
could measure directly the rates at which the operators make false and
correct identifications because they would know, with certainty, whether
the voice identification was correctY4°
In drug clinical trials, however, false-positive findings, or positive
responses not attributable to drug therapy, are difficult to identify with
certainty; their rates of occurrence are correspondingly difficult to mea-
sure. 141 In a controlled clinical trial it is not possible to measure accu-
rately exactly how the drug is working in each individual; this is due to
differences in test subjects' ages, genders, habits, overall states of health,
and genetic backgrounds.142 In addition, when a patient appears to re-
spond positively to the tested drug, it is impossible to be certain whether
the drug, or another factor such as the individual's psychological state,
caused the positive effect.' 4 3 Therefore, in drug efficacy studies it appears
almost impossible to calculate with accuracy a true false positive or a
true false negative. When drug examiners do attempt to calculate error
137. See, e.g., OSCAR TosI, VOICE IDENTIFICATION: THEORY AND LEGAL APPLICATIONS
97-106 (1979).
138. See, ag., id.
139. See, eg., id.
140. See, e.g., id
141. See, e.g., James H. Ware et al., P Values, in MEDICAL USES OF STATISTICS, supra note
125, at 181.
The problem of false-positive findings can be addressed in part by reporting confi-
dence intervals as well as significance levels. The confidence interval identifies the
range of values, such as differences in treatment effects, that is compatible with the
study results; wide confidence intervals help to identify studies with low reliability.
Discussions of power also have a place in reports of study results. For example, the
statement that the study had a power of 15 percent to detect a 50 percent reduction
in mortality conveys information different from the corresponding confidence inter-
val because it says, "we scarcely had a chance," and it facilitates proper weighing of
negative studies.
Id. at 196.
142. See, eg., Stephen J. Ackerman, Watching for Problems That Testing May Have
Missed, in NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT, supra note 108, at 49, 50.
143. See, e.g., M. ROBIN DIMATTEO & HOWARD S. FRIEDMAN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
AND MEDICINE 68-69 (1982).
The psychological state of the individual can either enhance or inhibit the individ-
ual's reactions to specific drugs. Human beings are active biological organisms that
respond in complex ways to the introduction of foreign agents. Just as the body may
be more or less susceptible to various diseases at various times, the body will also
react to various therapies and treatments in different ways at different times, depend-
ing on the psychological and emotional state of the person.
Id. at 68.
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rates in clinical trials, their methods are sometimes questionable. 144 The
statistical methods involved are so difficult to comprehend that even "ex-
perts" such as drug investigators, study reviewers, and editors of highly
respected medical journals may lack a sufficient understanding of statisti-
cal techniques to evaluate error rates appropriately.
145
In this hypothetical, according to the studies of plaintiff's expert,
seven of ten patients showed improvement with the herbal treatment,
and three did not. There is no evidence, however, about how many of
the seven were false positives, nor how many of the three that did not
improve were false negatives. Because the holistic practitioner did not
measure his results against a control group, this study does not afford
any data that would support a comparison of the effects of the treatment
at issue with the effects of conventional treatments, nor even with the
effects of a placebo. It seems meaningless in this case to speak of an
"error rate" when the study was not designed to enable comparison with
a control group.
1 46
If "study" means a testing program carried out in accordance with
conventional scientific methods, then it is a misnomer to call this evi-
dence a "study" at all. The study is essentially nothing more than an
anecdotal report that patients tried the drug and some of them improved.
Absent some comparison with an appropriate control group, the study
neither affords a scientific basis to conclude that the drug treatment is
what caused the improvement, nor a comparison of its efficacy with con-
ventional treatments. 147
Even if the holistic practitioner's report were a scientifically
designed study with a control group of patients who received either a
conventional therapy or a placebo, the error-rate criterion still would be
problematical due to the extremely small sample size-ten patients in
one study, and eight patients in the other.'
48
144. See, e.g., Freiman et al., supra note 125, at 357, 358.
145. See, e.g., id. at 357-72 ("The almost total lack of discussion of [alpha and beta error
rates] in the ... papers [studied] ... indicate[s] a need for greater education of investigators,
reviewers, and editors .... ").
146. See, e.g., id at 358 (discussing use of control group in randomized clinical trial).
147. Not including a control group in the investigation of an experimental drug "would
defeat the purpose of the clinical trial, making it impossible to learn whether the experimental
drug does, in fact, have any more effect than no treatment at all." Flieger, supra note I 11, at
12.
148. See DANIEL, supra note 125, at 143. One well-known survey of articles published in
prestigious medical journals concluded that sample sizes were often too small to support relia-
ble conclusions about drug efficacy. See Freiman et al., supra note 125, at 357. Freiman and
her coauthors based their conclusions upon two surveys, ten years apart, of papers published in
twenty different journals, including Lancet, The New England Journal of Medicine, and the
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Finally, as a fourth factor, trial judges should consider the degree to
which the proffered testimony has received "general acceptance" within
the "relevant scientific community." '49 Although an herbal treatment
for breast cancer may not be "generally accepted" among traditional
physicians, it may be considered perfectly acceptable among holistic
practitioners. The fact that another practitioner tested this expert's
treatment on her own patients tends to show that this treatment either
already has gained acceptance or soon will gain general acceptance
among the "relevant scientific community" of holistic health profession-
als. This may be enough to satisfy the trial judge. If not, the Daubert
opinion will remind the judge that
[n]othing in the text of this Rule [702] establishes "general ac-
ceptance" as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility.... [Fur-
thermore,] [t]he drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and
a rigid "general acceptance" requirement would be at odds
with the "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules and their "gen-
eral approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion'
testimony."1 50
Moreover, the judge must remember that the Daubert opinion empha-
sized that general acceptance, as well as all other factors of the admissi-
bility inquiry, is to remain a "flexible" criterion.' 51 Therefore, the
hypothetical holistic practitioner's herbal treatment will probably pass
the "general acceptance" prong. For example, in Cantrell v. GAF
Corp. , 152 a case recently decided using Daubert, two workers whose jobs
involved asbestos exposure, but who also smoked, sued their employer
for injuries, including "increased risk of contracting cancer," allegedly
resulting from their occupational exposure to asbestos.1 53 Plaintiffs' ex-
pert, a physician, had examined a total of 150 workers, including plain-
tiffs, as a union health screen. 5 4 He diagnosed three of the 150 as having
Journal of the American Medical Association. Id. at 364. Another commentator summarized
the Freiman results as follows: "This means that in 94 percent of the studies there was a
greater than 10 percent chance of missing a 25 percent therapeutic improvement, and in 70
percent of the studies there was a similar chance of missing a 50 percent improvement." Ware
et al., supra note 141, at 195-96 (citing Freiman et al., supra note 125, at 367-72). If Freiman
and her coauthors are correct, then it appears that even in the world's most prestigious medi-
cal journals sample sizes are often inadequate to afford appropriate sensitivity in measuring
drug efficacy.
149. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
150. Id. at 2794 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).
151. Id. at 2797.
152. 999 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1993).
153. Id. at 1010, 1012. Although only two employees sued, an additional employee was
diagnosed with cancer as well. See id. at 1013.
154. Id. at 1012-13.
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laryngeal15 5 cancer; he testified that in the general population, the inci-
dence of this type of cancer was only four out of 100,000 individuals per
year-a significantly lower rate than three out of 150.156 Defendants ob-
jected to the admission of this testimony, "asserting that three cases of
laryngeal cancer, all in smokers who had been exposed to asbestos, was
not probative of the association between asbestos and cancer."' 57 De-
fendants asserted that the smoker rate was compared erroneously against
the general population, which includes smokers, but is not comprised
exclusively of smokers.1 8 Furthermore, defendants asserted that the
prejudicial impact of this evidence outweighed its probative value, so that
it should be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.1
The appellate court affirmed the lower court's admission of plain-
tiffs' evidence, however, stating that "[n]othing in Rules 702 and 703 or
in Daubert prohibits an expert witness from testifying to confirmatory
data, gained through his own clinical experience .... ,16o The majority
was satisfied with the fact that plaintiffs' expert was subjected to cross-
examination, and that he based his opinion on "recognized sources."'
6 1
The court therefore found "no error in the admission of [this] testi-
mony." '6 2 The court seemed to easily admit this evidence of a possible
link between asbestos exposure and the three cases of laryngeal cancer,
while ignoring the possibility that the cancer very well could have been
caused by cigarette use alone.
Having reviewed the Cantrell court's application of the Daubert
standard, it appears that the hypothetical holistic practitioner's testi-
mony might be admitted. The hypothetical testimony about an herbal
mixture curing cancer seems no less dubious than the Cantrell testimony
about occupational asbestos exposure, and not cigarette smoking, causing
cancer.
Taking all factors into account, it is conceivable that the testimony
of the holistic practitioner might be ruled admissible under Daubert-
despite the small sample size, the lack of any evaluation of the likelihood
of false positives and false negatives, the lack of a rigorous comparison
155. The larynx is "the organ responsible for the production of vocal sounds, also serving as
an air passage conveying air from the pharynx to the lungs. It is situated in the front of the
neck.... ." THE BANTAM MEDICAL DICTIONARY 229 (Bantam Books 1982) (1981).
156. Cantrell, 999 F.2d at 1013.
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. Id. at 1014.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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with an appropriate control group, and the failure to rule out the possi-
bility that the cures, or observed improvements, might have been sponta-
neous and not caused by the herbal therapy.
b. Frye analysis
To be admissible under Frye, the holistic practitioner's herbal ther-
apy "must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs." 163 In order to assess its general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community, the trial judge first must
identify the "particular field" in which this therapy belongs.'6 How one
defines the appropriate field can have a bearing on the admissibility of the
proffered evidence.
i. scientific community of medical doctors
Assume the trial judge determines that the plaintiffs must prove that
this therapy is generally accepted in the traditional, "orthodox" medical
field. Intuitively, one might conclude that a decoction of herbs as a can-
cer therapy would not be generally accepted among medical doctors.
Based upon the Hoxsey cases of the 1950s, 165 this speculation is likely to
be correct.
Harry M. Hoxsey was not a doctor;166 yet the pink and black
medicines originally developed by his grandfather in 1840,167 which con-
sisted of mixtures of various barks, blossoms, and other elements, were
the main therapy for cancer patients treated at the Hoxsey Cancer Clin-
ics. 1 61 In 1936 Hoxsey set up his first clinic in Dallas, Texas; his second
163. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by FED. R.
EVID. 702, construed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993).
164. Courts often have difficulty defining the relevant scientific community. See Forinash,
supra note 12, at 257-58.
165. See, e.g., United States v. Hoxsey Cancer Clinic, 198 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 928 (1953); Hoxsey Cancer Clinic v. Folsom, 155 F. Supp. 376 (D.D.C.
1957); United States v. 10 Cartons Labeled in Part "Hoxsey", 152 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Pa.
1957).
166. Hoxsey, 198 F.2d at 278.
167. Id. It is said that the senior Hoxsey first conceived of this mixture after it allegedly
cured his horse's leg cancer. The horse had been grazing in a field containing cascara, bark of
prickly ash and buckthorn, red clover blossoms, roots of barberry and burdock, licorice, poke-
weed, and alfalfa; these became the ingredients of Hoxsey's "black medicine." Kardinal, supra
note 111, at 568.
168. Wallace F. Janssen, Cancer Quackery-The Past in the Present, 6 SEMINARS IN ON-
COLOGY, 526, 528-29 (1979); see Hoxsey, 198 F.2d at 277-78.
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clinic, in Portage, Pennsylvania, began treating patients in 1955.69 Due
to overwhelming popular demand, Hoxsey established an additional Los
Angeles, California clinic in 1957.170 If a Hoxsey practitioner diagnosed
"internal cancer," the practitioner would dispense a prescription for
either the pink or the black medicine, depending on the cancer's na-
ture.1 71 Some 10,000 cancer victims received the Hoxsey treatments.
172
Although the Hoxsey Clinics' staff included some physicians,1 73 the
clinic rejected "orthodox" methods of cancer therapy such as surgery
and x-ray therapy.174
The FDA disapproved of the Hoxsey cancer treatments, and issued
and displayed a circular in post offices warning the public that these
treatments did not cure cancer. 175 Hoxsey's followers led a "crusade of
prayer" and initiated a letter campaign to Congress. 176 Nonetheless, in
1952, relying on "the accepted views and findings of science," the Fifth
Circuit ruled that the Hoxsey medicines were not effective as cancer
cures.177 The clinics continued to operate, however, and the medications
continued to be sold.178 Finally, in 1960, after ten years of litigation, an
injunction stopped the sale of Hoxsey medications in the United
States.179 As of 1980 the Hoxsey cancer medicines were still available in
Tijuana, Mexico. 180
169. AMERICAN CANCER SOC'Y, UNPROVEN METHODS OF CANCER MANAGEMENT 108
(1971); see Janssen, supra note 168, at 529.
170. See AMERICAN CANCER Soc'Y, supra note 169, at 109. Hoxsey opened the Los Ange-
les clinic after "a large group of southern California citizens" signed a petition requesting that
he do so. Id
171. See 10 Cartons, 152 F. Supp. at 362.
172. Kardinal, supra note 111, at 568.
173. See 10 Cartons, 152 F. Supp. at 362.
174. See Hoxsey, 198 F.2d at 274. The clinic criticized these traditional therapies as "inef-
fective" and "positively harmful." Id. However, nonclinic physicians conducted studies
showing that the potassium iodide in the black medicine, if taken as recommended, could
cause untoward reactions in some people, and could possibly even accelerate the cancer's
growth. Id at 278.
175. See Folsom, 155 F. Supp. at 377.
176. Kardinal, supra note 111, at 568.
177. Hoxsey, 198 F.2d at 281. The court relied upon numerous physician-performed stud-
ies. Id. at 278. Among the determinations made were that the Hoxsey medications were
harmful, that the treatment could accelerate cancer growth, and that the therapy had no bene-
ficial effect on cancer-afflicted mice. Id.
178. See, e.g., AMERICAN CANCER Soc'Y, supra note 169, at 109-10.
179. Janssen, supra note 168, at 530; see also AMERICAN CANCER SoC'Y, supra note 168, at
109 ("In September 1960, the [FDA] reported that a permanent injunction.., banned the sale
of all Hoxsey medications ...."). For a detailed discussion of Harry Hoxsey and the events
surrounding his controversial cancer treatments, see id. at 107-10.
180. Kardinal, supra note I11, at 568.
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Similar to the medical community's rejection of the Hoxsey cancer
medicines of the 1950s, the hypothetical holistic practitioner's herbal
mixture probably will be considered contrary to the generally accepted
cancer therapy methods, particularly among oncologists.181 If such is
the case, this expert's testimony will likely be excluded under Frye.
ii. scientific community of holistic practitioners
In contrast to the scientific community of physicians, suppose that
the trial judge determines that general acceptance should be proven
within the field of holistic medicine. In this case holistic healers such as
chiropractors or herbalists would be consulted to determine general ac-
ceptance.18 2 Because the hypothetical herbal therapy is relatively new
and innovative, it is unlikely to have gained general acceptance, even
among herbal practitioners."8 3 The simple fact that two known practi-
tioners have used it and believe in its effectiveness probably is not enough
to constitute general acceptance.
84
In conclusion, both the medical doctors and the holistic healers are
unlikely to determine that the general consensus in each group would be
to use plaintiff's expert's relatively new herbal therapy to treat cancer.
Therefore, application of the Frye test would likely bar the admission of
this evidence.
181. Oncologists are physicians specializing in the study of tumors. WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1575 (1976). See infra part IV.B. (proposing that each
district retain panels of scientists representing each scientific discipline, and that questions of
general acceptance be submitted to appropriate panel for determination).
182. See infra part IV for a suggestion about how courts may assess general acceptance.
183. Use of the Frye test often prevents the admission of new or innovative procedures or
techniques. See, eg., Giannelli, supra note 51, at 1207 (stating that Frye test "eliminates the
need for time-consuming hearings on the validity of innovative techniques"); Forinash, supra
note 12, at 227-28 (stating that Frye standard restricts use of new scientific techniques which
may be valid); Comment, The Voiceprint Dilemma: Should Voices Be Seen and Not Heard?, 35
MD. L. REv. 267, 289 (1975) (noting that use of Frye retards "admission of scientific evidence
based on new procedures since it may be some time before they 'attain sufficient currency and
status to gain the general acceptance of the relevant scientific community'" (quoting United
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974))).
184. See, e-g., Comment, supra note 183, at 289 (stating that in situation where "one half
the scientific community testified that a procedure was reliable and one half testified that it was
not, the judge.., could not find that it was generally accepted").
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2. Experimental drug
a. Daubert analysis
i. reliability and relevance
The first step under Daubert is the reliability issue: Does this testi-
mony qualify as "scientific knowledge"?185 In deciding this the trial
court must determine whether the proffered scientific testimony is
grounded in the procedures and methods of science."' As discussed be-
low, the animal studies undoubtedly qualify. The ninety percent remis-
sion rate further supports this conclusion and favors the study's
validity."i 7 Thus, the animal studies appear to pass the test of reliability.
The next step is relevance: Does the proffered testimony " 'assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in is-
sue' ,,?i"' Will these animal studies at all assist in determining the
chance to cure issue? Animal studies are likely to be ruled relevant.
Before the FDA allows clinical trials in humans, "the agency requires
that the drug be administered to and its short-term effects be studied in
laboratory animals. The FDA uses data from these studies to decide if
the drug is sufficiently safe to be tested in humans." ' 9 Furthermore,
"animal studies provide information essential to the continued clinical
use and, ultimately, the approval of the drug."19 0 Although the results of
animal studies do not predict perfectly the drug's effects in humans,'91
"laboratory animals remain the best practical experimental models for
185. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
186. Id.
187. "In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scien-
tific validity." Id. at 2795 n.9.
188. Id. at 2795 (emphasis omitted) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
189. PAREXEL INT'L CORP., NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: A REGULATORY OVERVIEW
19 (Mark P. Mathieu & William J. Murphy III eds., 1987).
190. Id.
191. Limitations of animal testing include the fact that "[e]xtrapolation of toxicity data
from animals to humans is not completely reliable" and the fact that "rare adverse effects are
unlikely to be detected." Bertram G. Katzung, M.D. & Barry Berkowitz, Basic & Clinical
Evaluation of New Drugs, in BASIC AND CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 44, 45-47 (Bertram G.
Katzung, M.D. ed., 1987); see also COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORGS. OF MEDICAL SCIENCES,
SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FIRST USE OF NEW DRUGS AND DIAGNOSTIC AGENTS IN
MAN 16 (1983) (noting that (1) many animal studies involve use of inbred strains with re-
stricted genetic backgrounds, while humans' genetic backgrounds are more heterogeneous; (2)
results obtained are likely to be consistent with test species' restricted genetic make-up; and (3)
interspecies variations in pharmacokinetics, metabolism, or response may depend on functions
such as diet, further restricting the reliability of extrapolations between species); Robert E.
Scott, Jr., Junk Science Attempts to Create Medical and Scientific Causation, 57 DEF. COUNS.
J. 462, 469 (1990) (stating that animal studies raise hurdles with regard to causation, including
intraspecies variations and unreliability of extrapolation).
June 1994] 1539
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
identifying and measuring a compound's biological activity and for pre-
dicting its clinical effects."' 192 Moreover, despite any interspecies differ-
ences in metabolism, uptake, and organ distribution, "most toxicologists
believe that animal studies do have a role in predicting human toxic-
ity.,, 193 On the other hand, many drugs that raise interest in animal and
other laboratory tests never get used on humans due to their inefficiency,
excessive toxicity, or limited usefulness.194 One commentator estimated
that of every 2000 chemicals studied, only one proves safe and effective
enough to be sold for human use. 195 Others pessimistically estimate that
only one out of 10,000 ever finds its way to the pharmacy. 196 Therefore,
one may think of the relevancy of animal studies to human application as
possibly questionable. However, without animal studies, possibly no new
drugs would ever be discovered to be safe and effective in humans.197 On
balance, findings of efficacy and low toxicity in animals, while far from
conclusive as to a drug's suitability for human use, do tend to render it
"more probable than it would be without the evidence" that the drug is
safe and effective in humans; therefore, these findings are "relevant"
within the definition of Federal Rule of Evidence 401.198 Accordingly,
the evidence is arguably relevant, and the expert's testimony about it will
likely be found capable of "assist[ing] the finder of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue," thereby satisfying the require-
ment of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
192. PAREXEL INT'L CORP., supra note 189, at 19.
193. Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances
Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643,
656 (1992) (footnote omitted). Although animals are important in preclinical drug studies,
certain limitations must be recognized. Katzung & Berkowitz, supra note 191, at 45-47.
These include the ethical concerns of using large numbers of animals to obtain adequate data,
the unreliability of extrapolating toxicity data from animals to humans, and the unlikelihood
of detecting rare adverse effects. Id.
194. Flieger, supra note 111, at 11.
195. Cohn, supra note 108, at 9.
196. Id.
197. The first step in developing safety data for new drugs is preclinical animal testing.
PAREXEL INT'L CORP., supra note 189, at 19. Animal studies provide toxicological and phar-
macological information that is necessary if one wishes to obtain FDA authorization to begin
clinical trials. Id.; see also COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORGS. OF MEDICAL SCIENCES, supra note
191, at 35 (noting importance of investigating general pharmacological properties of drugs in
animals prior to administration in man).
198. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (" 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact ... of consequence ... more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.").
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ii. general observations
The next steps of the Daubert analysis are the four "general observa-
tions." First is testability: Has the proposed treatment been tested or is
it capable of being tested? According to the pharmacologist's testimony,
to date, Drug E has been tested formally only in rats and monkeys. It is
certainly a testable treatment, since its efficacy already has been tested
with a high degree of success in animals. That side effects and toxicity
were found to be minimal in these animals supports the proposition that
Drug E also is testable in humans.199 Although no tests have yet been
performed on human subjects in the United States, nor has any human
data been collected here, the fact that Drug E is available and used in
some foreign countries further strengthens the argument that it is "capa-
ble" of being tested2"° in humans. Drug E therefore should pass the
Daubert "testability" requirement; it not only "has been" tested on ani-
mals, but it also "can be" tested on humans. 01
This hypothetical unquestionably satisfies the second Daubert "gen-
eral observation" concerning peer review and publication. The New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine is a reputable, mainstream, peer-reviewed
medical journal.202 Since the pharmacologist has published a study in
that journal, Drug E clearly meets this requirement as to the animal
tests-despite the fact that there has not been a peer-reviewed or pub-
lished finding of efficacy in humans.
199. Toxicity is one factor that may prevent a seemingly interesting drug from making the
transition from animal studies to human clinical trials. Flieger, supra note Il, at 11.
200. "'T]he statements constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of empirical
test .... '" Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797 (quoting C. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL
SCIENCE 49 (1966)) (emphasis added).
201. See id. (quoting C. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 49 (1966)).
202. Physicians consider the New England Journal of Medicine one of the most highly re-
garded medical publications: "The New England Journal of Medicine is the premiere, most
cited-to journal; it may be the best in the world." Telephone Interview with John D. Abdu-
lian, M.D., Senior Fellow in Gastroenterology, Department of Medicine, Loma Linda Univer-
sity Medical Center (Jan. 11, 1994). Courts have recognized this journal's prestige as well.
See, e.g., Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203, 217 (D. Md. 1979) (describing New England Jour-
nal of Medicine as "highly regarded" journal); Grippe v. Momtazee, 705 S.W.2d 551, 557 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing New England Journal of Medicine as "prestigious" journal).
Although journals such as the Journal of the American Medical Association and the New Eng-
land Journal of Medicine are considered prestigious,
[a]rticles published in periodicals and journals are not vested with the same
trustworthiness and reliability as that possessed by standard texts used in the practice
and teaching of various professions. ...
... Many of the articles published in such journals are mere expressions of the
authors' opinions on controversial subjects.... [Such] articles relate to experimenta-
tion and speculation based upon preliminary studies and are intended to invoke com-
ment and criticism.
Id. at 556-57.
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The next "general observation" that trial courts are expected to con-
sider under Daubert is the error rate, either known or potential. In this
hypothetical the rate of remission in animal tests with Drug E is ninety
percent, with ten percent of the animals tested not responding. Assume
that enough testing has been conducted so that known error rates of five
percent for false positives and two percent for false negatives have been
obtained.20 3 The Daubert majority opinion is not enlightening as to what
the trial judge should do with a known or potential error rate; it only
advises that the trial court "should consider" error rates.2" Because the
known error rate of two percent for false negatives in this case is within
the acceptable range according to United States v. Williams,2 °5 cited by
the Daubert majority,2 °6 it arguably is acceptable-assuming that the re-
sults of animal studies are reliable predictors of drug efficacy and safety
in humans.20 7 The five percent rate for false positives falls within the
acceptable range in Williams before "doubtful comparisons were elimi-
nated. ' 208 Arguably, under Daubert, this also would be acceptable-
again assuming that animal studies are reliably predictive for humans.
Particularly because the admissibility inquiry under Daubert is to remain
"a flexible one,"2 9 the fact that these error rates were not obtained in
human studies might not bar their admissibility. A court might note, for
example, that the tests were performed on monkeys, and that monkeys
have been called "a relatively good human predictor. '210
203. In drug efficacy studies, because of variations in each subject receiving the drug and
other factors such as the complexity of the appropriate calculations, true error rates are ex-
tremely difficult to ascertain. See supra notes 137-48 and accompanying text for a complete
discussion of this problem.
204. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
205. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979). In the Williams case,
which dealt with spectrographic voice identification in a criminal trial, a false identification
rate of 6.3%-which was reduced to 2.4% after eliminating questionable cases-was held to
be an acceptable rate of error. Id. at 1198. The spectrographic voice analysis evidence was
therefore held admissible. Id. at 1201.
206. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797 (citing Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198).
207. It is not possible to state any generally applicable "error rate" in predicting human
safety and efficacy based on animal studies. However, it is well-documented that dramatic
differences between drug effects on humans and animals can and do appear. In addition, the
fact that a drug is safe and effective in animals is no guarantee that it will be so in humans. See
supra notes 193, 199 and accompanying text; infra notes 210, 218-40 and accompanying text.
208. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198.
209. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
210. Green, supra note 193, at 655. This is not always the case, however. See, e.g., Andrew
G. Hendrickx & Mark A. Cukierski, Reproductive and Developmental Toxicology in Nonhu-
man Primates, in PRECLINICAL SAFETY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS INTENDED FOR
HUMAN USE 73, 79 (Charles E. Graham ed., 1987) (stating that when imported primates are
used in drug study, lack of knowledge of animals' medical history could lead to use of animals
possessing medical conditions possibly affecting response to drug being studied); David P.
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Finally, under Daubert, "'general acceptance' [within the relevant
scientific community] can yet have a bearing on the inquiry." '211
Although Drug E's apparent success in animal studies was "accepted" in
the sense that it was published in the well-respected New England Jour-
nal of Medicine,22 its effectiveness in humans is not yet known, nor is
Drug E "generally accepted" for use in human patients in the United
States. It is, however, considered acceptable for human use in some for-
eign countries.2 1 3 Plaintiff's decedent allegedly had the resources to
travel to one of these countries for treatment. Although Drug E proba-
bly would not pass the "general acceptance" test for human treatment in
the United States, it arguably would pass as "generally accepted" in
some foreign countries.2" 4 Since plaintiff's decedent would have been
able to travel and receive treatment elsewhere had the diagnosis been
timely made, Drug E could arguably be considered generally accepted
under these specific circumstances. Even if the trial judge concluded that
Drug E's safety and efficacy are not generally accepted, this is only one of
the factors to consider in the "flexible" inquiry the Daubert majority
describes.
Although the only promising documented results for Drug E's use
in treating breast cancer are from animal studies, in light of the above
analysis, this experimental drug would arguably pass as admissible scien-
tific evidence under Daubert.
Rail, Animal Models for Pharmacotherapeutic Studies, in ANIMAL MODELS FOR BIOMEDICAL
RESEARCH III 125, 129 (1970) (noting that in toxicity studies of anticancer drugs, predictabil-
ity of biological effects from dogs and monkeys to humans failed with respect to renal toxic-
ity-this effect being found in test animals, but not in humans).
211. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
212. See supra note 202 and accompanying text for a discussion of the New England Jour-
nal of Medicine.
213. See supra note 111 for a discussion of non-FDA-approved drug availability in foreign
countries.
214. See supra note 111. A counterargument is that "general acceptance" in foreign coun-
tries cannot mean scientific acceptance, as Daubert seems to contemplate, if the laws of the
foreign countries in question do not impose stringent FDA-like testing and approval proce-
dures. A rigorous weighing of Daubert's "general observation" about "general acceptance"
would therefore arguably require the court to study foreign drug approval laws, and to take
evidence as to the strictness and skill with which those laws were enforced, before accepting
foreign availability as any evidence of a drug's scientific "general acceptance."
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b. Frye analysis
Under Frye21 5 first the relevant scientific community must be de-
fined.216 In this case because Drug E is undergoing the FDA approval
process, it is potentially a drug that will be used by physicians; hence,
physicians who diagnose and treat cancer should comprise the relevant
scientific community. Therefore, the degree of Drug E's general accept-
ance among oncologists-cancer specialists-should probably be
ascertained.217
Because animal studies appear successful and the FDA has not yet
approved Drug E for use in human clinical trials, the expert pharmacolo-
gist is suggesting that plaintiff's decedent should have been sent to a for-
eign country for treatment with Drug E. Most oncologists, or physicians
in general, would probably not consider this a generally accepted, viable
option.
i. reliability of animal testing
Animal studies2" 8 of a drug do not always reliably predict the drug's
likely effects on humans.21 9 At times a drug may appear extremely toxic
in animals, while there are no signs of serious reactions in humans. 220
Conversely, a drug may show no signs of toxicity in animal studies, while
215. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), superseded by FED. R. EVID. 702,
construed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
216. Cf. Forinash, supra note 12, at 257-58 (discussing courts' problems in defining scien-
tific community).
217. Patients usually first present themselves to a general practitioner; however, in the case
of breast cancer, a gynecologist may be the first to identify a potentially cancerous lump. If the
general practitioner or gynecologist suspected cancer, the doctor would then order further
testing to obtain a definitive diagnosis. Therefore, Drug E's general acceptance may have to be
determined in these fields as well. For the sake of simplicity, however, this Note will analyze
general acceptance among oncologists as being representative of all medical disciplines.
218. Preclinical testing (on animals) includes pharmacology and toxicity testing. PAREXEL
INT'L CORP., supra note 189, at 22-23. Pharmacological studies are aimed at determining
dose-response relationships, the drug's duration and mechanism of action, and information
about the drug's absorption, distribution, metabolism, and excretion. Id. at 23. Toxicity stud-
ies identify and measure a drug's long- and short-term toxic effects. Id.
219. See supra note 191 and accompanying text for a complete discussion of limitations
involved in animal testing.
220. See, e.g., Rail, supra note 210, at 125 (stating that "penicillin is so toxic in the guinea
pig that, had it first been tested in this species, it never would have been developed further");
B.P. Richardson et al., Bromocriptine, in SAFETY TESTING OF NEW DRUGS 19, 55-56 (D.R.
Laurence et al. eds., 1984) (reporting that rabbits receiving pituitary tumor treatment drug
bromocriptine reacted with uterine tumors and produced fetuses with cleft palates, while
"neither of these effects was relevant for the use of the compound in humans").
DAUBERT AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
humans experience severe adverse reactions.22 For example, animal
testing of practolol, a beta-blocker drug used to treat heart conditions,
showed no evidence of serious eye problems as a side effect.222 Later,
when humans used this drug, some developed oculomucocutaneous syn-
drome, a rare but serious eye condition.223 Animal testing of practolol
was, therefore, one of the "greatest failure[s] of extensive animal testing
for prediction of serious side effects ....
A recent and tragic example of a seemingly safe and promising new
drug is fialuridine (FIAU), which, despite having passed preclinical tests
in animals, caused death in five of fifteen human patients in long-term
clinical trials.225 FIAU, a remarkably promising new drug for the treat-
ment of the often-fatal liver disease hepatitis B,226 was undergoing its first
long-term human clinical trial.227 The drug appeared effective and safe
in animal studies.228 In March and April 1993, ten patients enrolled in a
six-month study of FIAU; five more enrolled in June.229 By early June
"several patients began complaining of nausea, vomiting and lack of ap-
petite.' ' 231 One patient showed elevated liver enzymes, which usually in-
dicates a flare-up of hepatitis. This was puzzling, however, since the
hepatitis virus was gone.23' On June 25 one of the study participants
developed multiorgan system failure: "His body was overwhelmed with
severe lactic acidosis. ' '2 32 Later that same day, the patient with the ele-
vated liver enzymes developed lactic acidosis as well.2 33 At that point,
all study participants were ordered to stop taking the drug. 234 Within
one week seven patients developed serious lactic acidosis; some patients
221. See, e.g., Mary J. Tucker et al., Tamoxifen, in SAFETY TESTING OF NEw DRUGS,
supra note 220, at 125, 157-58 (noting that with tamoxifen, an oral contraceptive used for
cancer therapy, most common reasons for withdrawing patient from drug are nausea and
vomiting-although neither reaction was observed in studies on dogs, which are normally con-
sidered predictive for vomiting in man).
222. See J.M. Cruickshank et al., Beta-adrenoceptor Blocking Drugs: Pronethalol, Propra-
nolol and Practolol, in SAFETY TESTING OF NEW DRUGS, supra note 220, at 93, 93, 120.
223. See id. at 120.
224. Id.
225. See Marlene Cimons, Fifth Patient Dies in Drug Test Gone Awry, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1,
1993, at A23.
226. Marlene Cimons, The Deadly Risks of Research, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1993, at Al.
227. Id. at A16.
228. Id. at Al.
229. Id. at A16.
230. Id. at A17.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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developed kidney and pancreas problems as well.2 35 Researchers sus-
pected that FIAU had damaged the mitochondria236 of cells in organs
throughout the body, with lethal results.237 During the month of July
four patients receiving the experimental treatment died due to its unex-
pected side effects.238 By the end of August, FIAU took the life of a fifth
patient.239 "'You're never sure what's going to happen with your first
human subjects .... [W]hen average people hear the term "clinical trial"
they think, "latest, state-of-the-art therapy." The reality is that "clinical
trial" should mean: "Possible dangerous substance. Beware. Could be
fatal." ' "240
ii. drug available in foreign country
As to the issue of travel to a foreign country, an example of a non-
FDA-approved cancer drug available abroad is Amygdalin, commonly
known as Laetrile.241 Laetrile, a "so-called cancer drug" derived from
apricot pits, is available in Mexican Laetrile clinics.242 Its alleged success
in the mid- to late-1970s is often attributed to the "resourcefulness of its
promoters" as well as psychological factors.243 Laetrile benefited from
the intense fears and anxieties of cancer patients and their families fol-
lowing diagnosis of the fatal, painful disease.2 " Its advocates argued
that cancer patients should be free to choose Laetrile, a "harmless" and
potentially beneficial drug, as a treatment option.245 While Laetrile was
drawing intense public interest, the American Medical Association, the
American Cancer Society, the Committee on Neoplastic Diseases of the
American Academy of Pediatrics, and most of America's eminent ex-
perts in the field did not recognize it as effective. 246 Nonetheless, in 1980
the FDA granted Laetrile Investigational New Drug (IND) status. 247
235. Id.
236. Cimons, supra note 225, at A23. Mitochondria are the "subunits of cells where energy
is produced." Id.
237. Cimons, supra note 226, at A17.
238. Id. at Al.
239. Cimons, supra note 225, at A23.
240. Cimons, supra note 226, at A16 (quoting Arthur Caplan, President of American Asso-
ciation of Bioethics).
241. "It is generally agreed the material in the United States known as laetrile is actually
amygdalin." Hindmarsh & LeGatt, supra note 111, at 94.
242. DIMATrEO & FRIEDMAN, supra note 143, at 64-65.
243. Stuart L. Nightingale, Laetrile: The Regulatory Challenge of an Unproven Remedy, 99
PUB. HEALTH REP. 333, 334 (1984).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 335.
247. Kardinal, supra note 111, at 569.
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Shortly thereafter, a well-controlled clinical trial of Laetrile began.248
Although a lay person may interpret the FDA's authorization of Laetrile
clinical trials as lending credibility to the drug's efficacy, in reality the
FDA was simply "yielding to public pressure.,
249
During the Laetrile trial, toxic side effects were discovered including
nausea, vomiting, headache, and dizziness.25 ° In addition, many patients
suffered from cyanide poisoning; evidently, the breakdown of Laetrile
caused cyanide release.2"' Cyanide levels in some patients reached levels
known to kill animals and possibly humans. 2  This study showed that
Laetrile produced no discernible benefit, as measured by de-
creased tumor size or prolongation of survival .... More than
three-quarters of the patients had died of their disease by the
end of the study, and their survival times seemed fully consis-
tent with those of patients receiving no treatment. Moreover,
several patients had symptoms suggestive of cyanide toxicity or
blood cyanide levels that approached the toxic range (or both).
Thus, the study demonstrated that Laetrile could not be consid-
ered either safe or effective.253
Because Laetrile had "been advertised to the public, the state legisla-
tures, and the courts as nontoxic, ' '2 4 the authors of the Laetrile study
deliberately emphasized the fact that "Laetrile is a toxic drug." '255
In light of the well-known problems in animal extrapolation-re-
cently exemplified by the FIAU tragedy-and the history of the Laetrile
controversy, most physicians probably would not consider it "generally
accepted" that animal-tested, but non-FDA-approved, Drug E is safe
and effective for use in humans. Therefore, the pharmacologist's expert
testimony probably would not be admitted under Frye.
248. Id.; see Nightingale, supra note 243, at 336.
249. Kardinal, supra note 111, at 569.
250. Charles G. Moertel, M.D., et al., A Clinical Trial ofAmygdalin (Laetrile) in the Treat-
ment of Human Cancer, 306 NEw ENG. J. MED. 201, 203 (1982).
251. Id. at 203-04.
252. Id. at 206.
253. Nightingale, supra note 243, at 336-37. Although some patients displayed minimal
improvements, these were "within the range that could be anticipated with placebo treat-
ment." Moertel et al., supra note 250, at 204-05. Given the great risk of toxicity, the risks of
such a treatment appear to be greater than any marginal benefit. See, e.g., id. at 204-06.
254. Moertel et al., supra note 250, at 206.
255. Id.
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C. Problems in Admitting Each Hypothetical Expert's Testimony
The Daubert decision lowers the barriers to the admissibility of sci-
entific, or so-called scientific, evidence and leaves trial judges with con-
siderable discretion. "'[W]ith the right judge-from a plaintiff's
standpoint . . . there is clearly a lower standard of admissibility.' )256
Because judges vary in their experience with scientific matters, their
knowledge or understanding in deciding what is scientifically valid will
also vary, and there will undoubtedly be inconsistencies in what is admit-
ted. Once "scientific" evidence is admitted, it often easily impresses lay
jurors and causes them to overestimate its probative value;257 jurors
therefore may misinterpret an "erroneous theory" as the prevailing scien-
tific consensus.2 5 8 If, in the above hypothetical variations, the proffered
expert testimony is indeed admitted, the defendant doctor will be at an
unfair disadvantage due to the trier of fact's tendency to accept scientific
testimony as absolute truth-thereby giving it more weight than war-
ranted-and its tendency to sympathize with a plaintiff whose misfortune
is unquestionably real, even if causation is in doubt.259
256. Reuben, supra note 8, at 31 (quoting attorney Raoul D. Kennedy).
257. See, e.g., United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1019 (1975) (claiming that because of its apparent objectivity, scientific testimony will likely
carry undue weight with trier of fact); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (asserting that scientific evidence may appear "mystically infallible" in eyes of lay jury);
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that "because of its aura
of special reliability and trustworthiness," scientific testimony may cause undue prejudice, or
may confuse or mislead jury).
258. Forinash, supra note 12, at 243-44.
259. Jurors may improperly consider invalid scientific testimony, because they are im-
pressed by the expert's credentials or courtroom manner. See, e.g., A. Harold Frost, Impartial
Medical Testimony, 1960 INS. L.J. 17, 18 ("An ignorant or corrupt doctor may be more im-
pressive on the witness stand than a learned and upright physician."); Edward J. Im-
winkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts
Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 577, 603
(1984) (stating that although jurors may recognize scientific technique as invalid, jurors often
nonetheless consider it as evidence because of expert's impressive credentials); Larry W. My-
ers, "The Battle of the Experts's A New Approach to an Old Problem in Medical Testimony, 44
NEB. L. REV. 539, 556 (1965) ("The testifying doctor who has the greater experience in the
courtroom and who is the more eloquent may win the minds of the jurors over the doctor who
may give more appropriately qualified but less eloquent testimony on the matter in question.").
Furthermore, many believe that "[p]laintiffs' attorneys love juries.... because juries' sympa-
thies can be appealed to." C. Edward Fletcher III, Learning to Live with the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act-Securities Litigation in a Post-McMahon World, 37 EMORY L.J. 99, 123 (1988).
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1. Holistic practitioner: Herbal treatment
One recent case decided under Daubert, Cantrell v. GAF Corp. ,2
suggests that the hypothetical holistic practitioner's testimony about his
self-tested herbal remedy may very well be admitted.261 One problem
with admitting opinion testimony as to the efficacy of the herbal mixture
as scientific evidence is that often such "miracle cures," which will re-
portedly cure some people with no proven traditional medical explana-
tion, actually are found to be ineffective.2 62 The explanation for their
apparent success is psychosomatic: The mind tells the body to get well,
and in some cases, the body heals itself.263 This occurs not only with
holistic medicine, but with faith healing as well.264
As an example, in the 1950s, researchers discovered Krebiozen, a
"miracle drug" believed to cure cancer.265 Thousands of cancer patients
vigorously attempted to obtain this unusual drug.266 Of those bedridden
patients who did take Krebiozen, many were soon out of bed, and in
many cases their tumors shrank dramatically.267 However, once re-
search proved that Krebiozen was not an effective cancer cure, patients
who were thought to be cured suddenly relapsed and died from their
cancer.268 The seemingly positive effects of Krebiozen therefore appear
to have been due to psychosomatic factors, rather than an actual phar-
macologic mechanism. This situation can be compared to that of the
hypothetical herbal mixture allegedly "curing" some patients-that is,
any improvement in the patients' condition possibly could have been due
to psychosomatic factors, rather than proven pharmacologic action.
260. 999 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1993).
261. See supra notes 152-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of Cantrell v. GAF
Corp., 999 F.2d 1007 (6th Cir. 1993).
262. Unproven methods of cancer management include everything from overt quackery
with intent to defraud to honestly well-intentioned, but unusual, treatments which have no
scientific basis. Kardinal, supra note 111, at 564. The "confused and terrified cancer patient"
who "will search for and cling to anything that gives him hope" is "easy prey" for promoters
of such cures. Id. Examples of "quack cancer remedies" include Krebiozen and Laetrile;
another unproven mixture was Harry Hoxsey's herbal tonic for internal cancer, introduced in
the 1950s. Id. at 567-68. See supra notes 165-80 and accompanying text for a complete dis-
cussion of the Hoxsey medicines.
263. DIMATrEO & FRIEDMAN, supra note 143, at 61-62.
264. Id. at 61-63.
265. Id. at 60. Krebiozen "achieved wide acclaim, partly because of the support of Dr.
Andrew C. Ivy, who had been a distinguished teacher and investigator." Nightingale, supra
note 243, at 333. As a cancer remedy, Krebiozen never was approved for use in the United
States. See id. In 1969 the interstate commerce of Krebiozen was banned permanently.
Kardinal, supra note 111, at 568.
266. DIMATTEO & FRIEDMAN, supra note 143, at 60.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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An additional reason why the holistic practitioner's opinion as to
the efficacy of his cancer cure should not be admitted into evidence is the
treatment's untested potential for dangerous side effects. Because it has
been neither FDA tested nor approved, its potential to cause harmful
side effects may not be known; until testing, the proposition that it is safe
is speculative. For example, during the clinical trial of Laetrile2 69 inves-
tigators discovered that the drug caused many toxic side effects, includ-
ing cyanide poisoning.1
7 0
Because the pharmacologic effects of the holistic practitioner's cure
have not been proven, evidence that it seemingly did cure should be ex-
cluded. Additionally, due to the lack of formal FDA-approved testing of
the mixture, dangerous side effects or harmful byproducts have not been
identified; therefore, testimony that plaintiff's decedent should have re-
ceived this treatment should be prohibited.
2. Ph.D. pharmacologist: Experimental Drug E
To a trial judge or a juror, Drug E would probably appear to be
more scientifically valid than the herbal mixture: After all, the animal
studies sound promising, it is already available in some countries, and the
drug company has applied to the powerful FDA. Nonetheless, testimony
as to Drug E's possibility of curing plaintiff's decedent should not be
admitted.
First, a drug's success in animal studies does not always correlate to
success in humans. Due to interspecies variation in metabolism and size,
as well as other factors, "the causal inference from an animal study to a
similar effect in the human population is... tenuous."2 7 ' Furthermore,
doses to which animals are exposed are "many multiples or orders of
magnitude [greater than] a typical human dose," thus raising questions
about the dose-response relationship for animals as compared with
humans.27 2 Because of differences between test animals and humans
269. Id. at 64-65. For a further discussion of Laetrile, see supra notes 241-55 and accompa-
nying text.
270. Moertel et al., supra note 250, at 203-04.
271. Green, supra note 193, at 654; see also COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORGS. OF MEDICAL SCI-
ENCES, supra note 191, at 12 (stating that in new drug development, "[s]pecies differences in
response and the very unsatisfactory nature of many animal models of human disease are
important limitations in transferring animal data to man"). For further discussion ofproblems
in extrapolating results of animal studies to man, see supra notes 218-40 and accompanying
text.
272. Green, supra note 193, at 655-56; cf Bruce N. Ames & Lois Swirsky Gold, Too Many
Rodent Carcinogens: Mitogenesis Increases Mutagenesis, 249 ScI. 970, 970 (1990) ("Animal
cancer tests are conducted at near toxic doses.., of the test chemical, for long periods of time
. . ) .
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with respect to effectiveness, toxicity, and other factors, most drugs that
appear promising in animal studies are never tested in human clinical
trials.
273
Second, the fact that a drug is available and used in a foreign coun-
try is not necessarily probative of its safety or efficacy. For example,
Laetrile became well-known in the United States in the 1970s. 274 How-
ever, it was found to be toxic275 and ineffective, 276 and was not approved
for use in this country.2 7 7 Many American cancer patients therefore
traveled to Mexico to undergo treatment with this drug. 278 Often, pa-
tients turn to nonapproved therapies such as Laetrile because of dis-
enchantment or anger with the medical establishment.2 79 This can prove
dangerous and result in enormous costs for patients, their families, and
society in general.28°
Finally, a drug company's application to the FDA for approval of a
specific drug does not mean that the drug will be approved for use in
human clinical trials, nor that it will pass the other stages necessary for
approval: "[O]f 100 drugs for which investigational new drug applica-
tions are submitted to FDA, [only] about 20 of the original 100 will ulti-
mately be approved for marketing.
'281
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
After Daubert the tendency of federal trial judges will probably be
to admit scientific evidence that previously was inadmissible, and to in-
struct jurors as to its weight.2 82 Lay jurors may not easily recognize
when scientific testimony is valid and when it is tenuous or "junk sci-
ence." '283 As a result, juries may find erroneously in favor of the party
273. Flieger, supra note 111, at 11.
274. For a further discussion of Laetrile, see supra notes 241-55 and accompanying text.
275. Moertel et al., supra note 250, at 206. The toxicity was due to cyanide poisoning. Id.
at 203-04, 206.
276. Id. at 204-05.
277. Nightingale, supra note 243, at 337. In fact, the FDA distributed leaflets to consum-
ers, published articles, and disseminated a public warning to educate and warn the public,
health professionals, and state legislators about the hazards of Laetrile use. Id.
278. DIMATTEO & FRIEDMAN, supra note 143, at 65.
279. Id.; see also Nightingale, supra note 243, at 334 (stating that promise of cure not avail-
able from "orthodox" medicine is attractive to cancer patients, and that Laetrile promoters
encouraged cancer patients to feel that they were collaborating in effort to "show up"
establishment).
280. DIMATTEO & FRIEDMAN, supra note 143, at 65.
281. Flieger, supra note 111, at 12.
282. Reuben, supra note 8, at 31 (comment of attorney David M. Harney).
283. See supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of lay jurors' difficulty
in adequately comprehending scientific evidence. "Junk science" has been described as "elabo-
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offering the questionable scientific testimony, particularly when that
party is a plaintiff who has suffered an appalling misfortune and the only
real issue is what caused it."' a At best, use of the Daubert rather than
Frye standard will encourage inconsistent, arbitrary admissibility rulings,
and hence unpredictable liability exposures and verdict sizes.2"5 There-
fore, Daubert should be abandoned.
A. Frye Plus Some
To prevent the admission of questionable, unproven hypotheses"8 6
and junk science,18 7 and to avoid erroneous court decisions based on
them, federal courts should return to the Frye test. To ensure that a
technique, doctrine, or conclusion is indeed "generally accepted" in the
relevant scientific community, courts should take advantage of the ability
to call their own experts.288 For example, one commentator suggested
that
[if] only proponents of a technique appear, the court should sua
sponte take the responsibility of inquiring not just whether the
experts believe the scientific community is generally in agree-
ment, but whether they are in fact aware of any opposing senti-
ment in the relevant scientific community. The court should
then make an effort to ascertain the extent of any opposition so
rate, systematized, jargon-filled, serious-sounding deceptions." PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 2 (1991). It "is a hodgepodge of biased data,
spurious inference, and logical legerdemain, patched together by researchers whose enthusiasm
for discovery and diagnosis far outstrips their skill. It is a catalog of every conceivable kind of
error: data dredging, wishful thinking, truculent dogmatism, and, now and again, outright
fraud." Id. at 3.
284. See, e.g., Forinash, supra note 12, at 223-24 (discussing Geletucha v. 222 Delaware
Corp., 182 N.Y.S.2d 893 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959), where New York judge admitted "junk sci-
ence" that commercial dry cleaning chemical caused decedent's renal failure; despite over-
whelming scientific evidence that chemical did not cause renal failure, jury awarded
multimillion dollar judgment to decedent's widow).
285. Cf Giannelli, supra note 51, at 1206-07 (stating that proponents of Frye test argue,
among other things, that Frye promotes uniformity in decisions); Miceli, supra note 12, at 944
("The use of the lay jury system in medical malpractice flourishes due to tradition and the
doctrine of stare decisis .... [T]he current system encourages arbitrary verdicts."); Comment,
supra note 183, at 290 (noting that use of Frye standard results in "greater uniformity in
decisions").
286. Unproven hypotheses should not be admitted into evidence. See, e.g., United States v.
Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977) (noting that "[a] courtroom is not a research
laboratory").
287. See supra note 283 for a definition of "junk science."
288. FED. R. EVID. 706.
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identified, calling its spokes[persons] as court-appointed experts
if necessary.28 9
Similarly, another commentator proposed that trial courts retain a "pool
of experts" to consult in questions of general acceptance, or alternatively
call experts of their own choosing.290
In sum, courts must find a way to ensure that scientific expert testi-
mony admitted is indeed scientific and possesses a proper foundation. If
they do not, it "may tend to confuse or mislead the trier of fact and thus
defeat a defendant's right to a fair trial."'29 1 Assuring that the subject of
scientific testimony is generally accepted is one effective way to achieve
this goal.
B. Proposal: Statutory Duty of Courts to Request Rulings on General
Acceptance from Preselected Panels of Experts
In order to eliminate the admission of any "manufactured evidence"
or nonaccepted scientific techniques, federal courts should be under a
statutory duty to request rulings on general acceptance of scientific evi-
dence from preselected panels of experts.292 These groups of experts, the
members of which would possess valid licenses in their respective fields
and be approved by the National Academy of Sciences293 or the Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement of Science,294 would include sev-
289. Comment, supra note 183, at 293.
290. Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67
IOWA L. REv. 879, 911 (1982).
291. Brown, 557 F.2d at 556.
292. Although this approach may appear to be contrary to the adversary system, it will lead
to more uniformity in determining "general acceptance" and will avoid problems of compre-
hension by the trial judge or jury. See, e.g., Wesley, supra note 12, at 681-86 (commenting on
juries' and trial judges' difficulty in comprehending scientific evidence); Reuben, supra note 8,
at 32 (quoting attorney Raoul D. Kennedy: Daubert will "lead to less consistent results.").
293. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) is a private scientific organization, member-
ship in which is a "significant honor." Brief for the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science and the National Academy of Sciences as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 2, Daubert (No. 92-102). The NAS's "congressional charter, which was signed
into law by President Lincoln, provides that the Academy 'shall, whenever called upon by any
department of the Government, investigate, examine, experiment, and report upon any subject
of science or art .... " Id. (quoting 36 U.S.C. § 253 (1988)). The NAS works through the
National Research Council to examine "scientific and technological questions of national im-
portance, typically referred to it by Congress or the Executive Branch." Id. The NAS has a
"continuing involvement in the intersection of science and law." Id.
294. The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) "is a non-profit
scientific society that, among other objectives, seeks to increase public understanding and ap-
preciation of the importance and promise of science in advancing human progress." Id. at 1.
Consisting of nearly 300 affiliate organizations and over 134,000 members including scientists,
engineers, educators, and policy makers, the AAAS "is now the world's largest general scien-
tific organization." Id. at 1-2. Its official journal, Science, is "one of the world's most
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eral individuals representing each scientific discipline. In order to
conserve court time, notice of all scientific evidence questions would be
required in advance of trial or any summary judgment motion. The
questions would be collected and sent to the appropriate committees of
scientific experts. These panels would meet at frequent intervals to deter-
mine the "general acceptance" of each issue in question. In a medical
malpractice case, for example, the court would refer the particular "gen-
eral acceptance" question to a panel of professionals having pertinent
expertise. An issue of cancer drug efficacy and safety would, for exam-
ple, be directed to a preappointed group of oncologists and pharmacolo-
gists. After the appropriate committee reaches a decision as to the
scientific technique's general acceptance, this "ruling" would be sent to
the court and accordingly used in determining whether or not to admit
the proffered evidence.
Such asystem, which would have the effect of screening out expert
opinion testimony that has not been shown to rest on scientifically sound
principles and methodologies, has several advantages. 295 First, it avoids
much of the in-court "battle of the experts. '2 96 Because all such opinion
testimony previously will have been adjudged to rest on principles and
methodologies "generally accepted" in the appropriate field, the problem
of judges or juries having to decide between "junk science" and real sci-
frequently cited scientific journals." Id. at 2. Like the NAS, the AAAS is involved in the
"intersection of science and law" and has an "interest in assuring that the courts avoid reliance
on putatively scientific evidence that does not in fact reflect the application of scientific princi-
ples." Id.
295. At first glance the described system may appear unduly costly. If the system were
properly instituted, however, its costs probably would amount to no more than the current
trial costs for presenting scientific evidence. Currently, when faced with scientific testimony,
the trial judge must rule on its admissibility. This can take considerable time, particularly if
the scientific issues are difficult to comprehend. See supra notes 12, 257-59 and accompanying
text. If the judge errs by admitting evidence that is not generally accepted in its field, expenses
really start to escalate. Each party must hire expert witnesses to either support or refute the
evidence. The cost of keeping the court running each day of trial that the opposing experts
"battle it out" should also be considered. Although this cost is not borne entirely by the
litigants, it is paid by society: Every day a court is tied up in resolving a scientific evidence
admissibility dispute, that court is unavailable for other public business. There are other social
costs as well. In particularly long trials, some jurors may not be paid for time away from
work; their employers lose their employees' productivity. In addition, doctors have to live
with the constant fear of a lawsuit brought on unfounded claims; consequently, they must
constantly practice defensive medicine, necessarily fearing that "junk science" could be used
against them in a trial. In light of all these factors, the proposed system may actually prove
more cost-efficient than the present one. Given the great financial and societal costs paid when
"junk science" is admitted under the present system, it is arguable that we cannot afford not to
institute the proposed system.
296. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 259 (discussing battle of experts in medical malpractice
cases).
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ence is avoided. In addition, if courts adopt this practice, the risk of a
possibly "ignorant or corrupt doctor" appearing more impressive to the
jury than a "learned and upright physician" is at least reduced.297 Fur-
thermore, because issues of general acceptance will not have to be argued
and decided in court, this approach eliminates or reduces the problems of
overburdening the courts with scientific issues and loss of judicial
time.298 Judges and juries will not have to spend tremendous amounts of
time attempting to understand the scientific subject matter of techniques
that are not generally accepted.299 Juries will still have to hear scientific
evidence, but judges will not have to spend time trying to comprehend an
esoteric debate about such things as the statistical significance of the
proffered epidemiological evidence.3
Critics of Frye cite its restriction on the admission of "new, but
valid, scientific techniques."30 1 In issues of drug efficacy and safety, how-
ever, this should rarely present a problem. If the expert opinion that the
drug is safe and effective rests upon studies of the kind required by the
FDA, then the evidence will pass the Frye test; it will then be clear that
the principles and methodologies underlying the opinion are "generally
accepted" within the relevant scientific community. On the other hand,
if the opinion rests on anything less than scientifically sound studies, then
it is speculative and should be excluded for that reason. In such cases the
Frye test may be strict, but it is also fair.
Where the issue is negligent treatment, as opposed to negligent fail-
ure to diagnose, it should rarely, if ever, be malpractice for a doctor to
decline to prescribe an experimental drug whose toxicity has not been
297. Cf Frost, supra note 259, at 18.
298. See, e.g., Wesley, supra note 12, at 686 (noting that "[c]ourt dockets are overloaded").
299. See, e.g., id. at 681-86; see also supra notes 257-59 and accompanying text (discussing
juries' difficulty in understanding scientific subject matter).
300. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 575 (S.D.
Cal. 1989), affid, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993).
301. Forinash, supra note 12, at 227-28; see Giannelli, supra note 51, at 1223. Coinci-
dently, the Daubert approach also may cause innovative, authentic scientific testimony occa-
sionally to be withheld from the jury, a possibility acknowledged by the Daubert court. See
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798-99 (1993).
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well-tested in humans.3 2 Indeed, a physician might risk malpractice lia-
bility if he or she does prescribe the drug in those circumstances. 30 3
V. CONCLUSION
In the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist,
"General observations" by this Court customarily carry
great weight with lower federal courts, but the ones offered [in
the Daubert majority opinion] suffer from the flaw common to
most such observations-they are not applied to deciding
whether or not particular testimony was or was not admissible,
and therefore they tend to be not only general, but vague and
abstract.
304
By not specifically applying the "general observations" to the Daubert
case, not concretely explaining how each one should be applied, and not
defining what each one means, the Daubert majority opinion leaves al-
ready busy trial judges to figure out for themselves how to interpret and
apply this opinion to proffered scientific testimony. Intelligent and
proper application of the Daubert rule will impose enormous burdens on
the time and energies of trial judges.
Daubert appears to leave judges with wide discretion in determining
admissibility. Thus, vastly inconsistent outcomes in admissibility rulings
will result, depending on each judge's scientific comprehension and, per-
haps, on the judge's personal inclinations as well. Most judges lack the
scientific training necessary to make truly informed decisions in the area
of scientific testimony.3 05 As a result, a great deal of evidence previously
inadmissible under Frye will be placed before juries. Because most jurors
302. In the United States drugs first are tested on animals and then in humans. Cohn, supra
note 108, at 6-7. The recent FIAU fiasco illustrates the fact that a drug apparently safe in
animals may be fatally toxic in humans. See supra notes 225-40 and accompanying text. At
least one lawsuit has been filed as a result of this tragedy. See Eva M. Rodriguez, Drugmaker
Defends Fatal Experiment, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 29, 1993, at 6, 6.
303. Physicians are increasingly wary of possible malpractice liability. See, e.g., DIMAT-
TEO & FRIEDMAN, supra note 143, at 29 (observing recent increase in malpractice insurance
rates and fact that "the entire health care system appears to be alarmed at the extensive patient
retaliation against physicians"); JAMES ROSENBLUM, MALPRACTICE SOLUTIONS 13 (1993)
(stating that "malpractice hangs like a cloud over our health-care system"). As a result, physi-
cians may tend to proceed cautiously when treating their patients, using only treatments
proven safe and effective.
304. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2799 (1993) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
305. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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lack a solid scientific understanding,30 6 they are apt to give dubious testi-
mony far more weight than it deserves-particularly when it is offered by
a plaintiff whose plight is likely to evoke sympathy and influence a jury
to overlook any doubts about causation. The outcome can be quite dev-
astating: Judgments may be entered wrongfully against nonresponsible
parties.
The Daubert opinion leaves many questions unanswered. Does the
opinion apply exclusively to scientific experts, or does it extend to those
testifying to "technical" knowledge as well? What if the two "general
observations" of low rate of error and testability are satisfied, and the
two of general acceptance and peer review are not? What if all factors
but general acceptance are met? Or, what if, at first glance, none of the
factors are conclusively met, but the trial judge becomes convinced that
by contorting the amorphously defined "general observations," all four
categories will be satisfied? A return to the common-law Frye test, along
with the use of preapproved scientific committees to determine "gen-
eral acceptance," would solve the many problems raised by the United
States Supreme Court's majority opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Katherine M. Atikian*
306. See, e.g., Miceli, supra note 12, at 944 ("In medical malpractice actions the lay jury
simply has no basis in education, training, or experience upon which to arrive at a rational and
reasoned verdict.").
* I would like to thank John D. Abdulian, M.D.; Professor David P. Leonard; H. Reed
Metzger, M.D.; John A. Peak, Esq.; Jerrold B. Reilly, Esq.; and Lee E. Vail, Esq.--each of
whom patiently read through drafts of this Note and kindly offered insightful comments and
suggestions. Thanks are also due to Alison T. Atikian and Raffi G. Najarian, D.D.S., for
library assistance. This Note is dedicated to the memory of Deborah L. Haake, Pharm.D.,
J.D. (Loyola Law School 1988), whose energy and love of science, the law, and life will forever
serve as an inspiration.
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